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Have Inter-Judge Sentencing Disparities Increased in an Advisory
Guidelines Regime? Evidence From Booker
Crystal S. Yang∗
The Federal Sentencing Guidelines were promulgated in response to concerns of widespread disparities in sentencing. After almost two decades of determinate sentencing, the Guidelines were rendered advisory in United States
v. Booker. How has greater judicial discretion affected inter-judge disparities, or differences in sentencing outcomes that are attributable to the mere
happenstance of the sentencing judge assigned? This Article utilizes new data
covering almost 400,000 criminal defendants linked to sentencing judge to
undertake the first national empirical analysis of inter-judge disparities post
Booker.
The results are striking: inter-judge sentencing disparities have doubled
since the Guidelines became advisory. Some of the recent increase in disparities can be attributed to differential sentencing behavior associated with judge
demographic characteristics, with Democratic and female judges being more
likely to exercise their enhanced discretion after Booker. Newer judges appointed after Booker also appear less anchored to the Guidelines than judges
with experience sentencing under the mandatory Guidelines regime.
Disentangling the effect of various actors on sentencing disparities, I find
that prosecutorial charging is a prominent source of disparities. Rather than
charge mandatory minimums uniformly across eligible cases, prosecutors appear to selectively apply mandatory minimums in response to the identity of
sentencing judge, potentially through superseding indictments. Drawing on
this empirical evidence, the Article suggests that recent sentencing proposals
that call for a reduction in judicial discretion in order to reduce disparities
may overlook the substantial contribution of prosecutors.
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I NTRODUCTION
The Federal Sentencing Guidelines (Guidelines) were adopted to counter widespread
disparities in federal sentencing. By the 1970s, the federal system exhibited “an
unjustifiably wide range of sentences to offenders convicted of similar crimes” because each judge was “left to apply his own notions of the purposes of sentencing.”1
Disparities were so pronounced that a defendant sentenced to three years by one
judge would have been sentenced to twenty years had he been assigned to another
judge.2 Decrying these disparities and championing sentencing reform, Judge Marvin Frankel of the Southern District of New York claimed that “the almost wholly
unchecked and sweeping powers we give to judges in the fashioning of sentences
are terrifying and intolerable for a society that professes devotion to the rule of
law.”3
In response, policymakers sought to limit the “unfettered discretion the law confers on those judges and parole authorities [that implement] the sentence.”4 Under
the Sentencing Reform Act of 1984 (SRA), Congress created the United States
Sentencing Commission to promulgate the Guidelines,5 a new regime intended to
reduce disparities stemming from judicial preferences and biases rather than offense
and offender characteristics.6 Congress directed the Commission, an independent

1

S. Rep. No. 97-307, at 5 (1981).
Anthony Partridge & William B. Eldridge, Federal Judicial Center, The Second Circuit Study:
A Report to the Judges of the Second Circuit 36 (1974). A unique experiment, the Second Circuit
Study presented the district court judges in the Second Circuit with approximately twenty presentence reports of actual defendants in representative cases, allowing the researchers to observe how
judges render sentences in identical cases. Id. at 1. Large differences of several years in sentence
lengths were common, and in 16 of the 20 cases, there was no unanimity about whether incarceration was even appropriate. Id. at 5-7. In a representative extortion case, sentences ranged from three
years with no fine to 20 years in prison with a $65,000 fine. Id. at 5-6. In a representative bank
robbery case, more than six judges imposed a sentence length of 15 years or more, while at least six
judges imposed sentence lengths of five years or fewer. Id. at 9.
3
M ARVIN E. F RANKEL, C RIMINAL S ENTENCES : L AW W ITHOUT O RDER 5 (1973).
4
See S. Rep. No. 98-225, at 38 (1983) (Senate Report on precursor to federal Sentencing Reform
Act of 1984) (“[E]very day Federal judges mete out an unjustifiably wide range of sentences to
offenders with similar histories, convicted of similar crimes, committed under similar circumstances.
. . . These disparities, whether they occur at the time of the initial sentencing or at the parole
stage, can be traced directly to the unfettered discretion the law confers on those judges and parole
authorities responsible for imposing and implementing the sentence”); Id. at 49 (“[T]he present
practices of the federal courts and of the parole commission clearly indicate that sentencing in the
federal courts is characterized by unwarranted disparity and by uncertainty about the length of time
offenders will service in prison.”).
5
Pub. L. No. 98-473, 98 Stat 1837, 1987 (1984) (codified as amended at 18 USC §3551 et seq.,
28 USC §991 et seq.). For a discussion of the efforts leading up to the the promulgation of the SRA,
see Kate Stith & Steve Y. Koh, The Politics of Sentencing Reform: The Legislative History of the
Federal Sentencing Guidelines, 28 WAKE F OREST L. R EV. 223, 230 (1993).
6
U.S.S.G. §1A.1, intro to comment, pt. A, ¶2 (Congress “sought uniformity in sentencing by
narrowing the wide disparity in sentences imposed by different federal courts for similar criminal
conduct”); S. Rep. No. 225, at 45 (1983) (“Sentencing disparities that are not justified by differences
among offenses or offenders are unfair both to offenders and to the public.”).
2

Inter-Judge Disparities After Booker

2

agency within the judicial branch,7 to fashion sentencing guidelines aimed at the
primary goal of avoiding unwarranted sentencing disparity.8
After the implementation of the Guidelines, researchers began to investigate
the extent to which the Guidelines reduced disparities.9 Initial work by Anderson,
Kling, and Stith revealed that the Guidelines were somewhat successful in reducing
inter-judge sentencing disparity.10 The authors estimate that the expected difference
in sentence length between judges fell from 17% (4.9 months) in 1986-87 to 11%
(3.9 months) in 1988-93 in 26 cities where case assignment was found sufficiently
random.11 Another study by Hofer, Blackwell, and Ruback also found evidence
of reduced inter-judge sentencing disparities after the promulgation of the Guidelines.12 The study concludes that the Guidelines achieved “modest success” in reducing inter-judge disparities, documenting that the sentencing judge accounted for
2.32% of the variation in sentences in 1984-85, but only 1.24% under the Guidelines
in 1994-95.13 Convergence in findings by these researchers and the Commission
led the Commission to conclude that “the federal sentencing guidelines [had] made
significant progress toward reducing disparity caused by judicial discretion.”14
Following nearly two decades of mandatory Guidelines sentencing, the Guide7

See 28 U.S.C. §991(a). The Commission was placed in the Judicial Branch because Congress
concluded that “sentencing should remain primarily a judicial function,” and because sitting judges
would serve on the Commission. S. Rep. No. 98-225, at 159 (1983). The Commission is comprised of seven voting members. 28 U.S.C. §991(a). The SRA provides that “[a]t least three of
the [Commission] members shall be Federal judges selected after considering a list of six judges
recommended to the President by the Judicial Conference of the United States” and no more than
four members of the Commission can be members of the same political party. See id. The Commission later withstood separation-of-powers challenges, as the Court rejected several constitutional
challenges to the Commission and its delegated authority. See Mistretta v. United States, 488 U.S.
361 (1989).
8
See, e.g., Stephen Breyer, The Federal Sentencing Guidelines and the Key Compromises Upon
Which They Rest, 17 H OFSTRA L. R EV. 1, 3 (1988) (explaining that Congress sought to reduce
"unjustifiably wide" sentencing disparity.); Kenneth R. Feinberg, Federal Criminal Sentencing Reform: Congress and the United States Sentencing Commission, 28 WAKE F OREST L. R EV. 291, 295
(1993) (“The first and foremost goal of the sentencing reform effort was to alleviate the perceived
problem of federal criminal sentencing disparity.”).
9
While the Guidelines were effectively mandatory, the Guidelines did provide a permissible
range of sentence lengths. 18 U.S.C. 3553(a)(4). Thus, one should expect that the Guidelines would
ameliorate, but not completely eliminate, inter-judge disparities.
10
James M. Anderson et al., Measuring Interjudge Sentencing Disparity: Before and After the
Federal Sentencing Guidelines, 42 J.L. & E CON . 271, 303 (1999) (“The Guidelines have reduced the net variation in sentence attributable to the happenstance of the identity of the sentencing
judge.”).
11
Id. at 294.
12
Paul J. Hofer, Kevin R. Blackwell, & R. Barry Ruback, The Effect of the Federal Sentencing
Guidelines on Inter-Judge Sentencing Disparity, 90 J. C RIM . L. & C RIMINOLOGY 239, 241 (1999).
See id. at 284-86 for a discussion of the statistical techniques employed in the study.
13
Id. at 241, 287 (“Together with the other research reviewed below, [our] findings suggest that
the sentencing guidelines have had modest but meaningful success at reducing unwarranted disparity
among judges in the sentences imposed on similar crimes and offenders.”)
14
United States Sentencing Commission, F IFTEEN Y EARS OF G UIDELINES S ENTENCING : A N
A SSESSMENT OF H OW W ELL THE F EDERAL C RIMINAL J USTICE S YSTEM IS ACHIEVING THE
G OALS OF S ENTENCING R EFORM 99 (Nov. 2004).
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lines were struck down in United States v. Booker,15 dramatically altering the sentencing landscape. In Booker, the Supreme Court found that the mandatory application of the Guidelines violated defendants’ Sixth Amendment right to a jury
trial and rendered the Guidelines advisory. Subsequent Supreme Court decisions
furthered weakened the effect of the Guidelines on criminal sentencing by reducing
the degree of appellate scrutiny applied to sentences both within and outside the
Guidelines range. In Rita v. United States, the Court permitted courts of appeals to
apply a presumption of reasonableness to within Guidelines sentences.16 Later, in
Gall v. United States, the Court held that appellate courts could not presume that a
sentence outside the Guidelines range was unreasonable, reducing the degree of appellate review to a more deferential abuse of discretion standard.17 Concurrent with
Gall, the Court held in Kimbrough v. United States that federal district court judges
have the discretion to impose sentences outside the recommended Guidelines range
due to policy disagreements with the Sentencing Commission.18
After Booker and its progeny, Rita, Gall, Kimbrough, the legal community expressed concerns as to how these decisions would impact inter-judge sentencing
disparities. Congressman Tom Feeney wrote that “the Supreme’s Court decision
[in Booker] to place this extraordinary power to sentence a person solely in the
hands of a single federal judge - who is accountable to no one - flies in the face
of the clear will of Congress.”19 Patrick Fitzgerald, United States Attorney for
the Northern District of Illinois, stated that Booker “re-introduced into federal sentencing both substantial district-to-district variations and substantial judge-to-judge
variations.”20 Similarly, scholars noted the dramatic increase in discretion afforded
to judges,21 and predicted an increase in unwarranted sentencing disparities.22
Due to suggestive evidence of increasing disparities post Booker, the United
States Sentencing Commission and policymakers have commented on possible ways
to constrain judicial discretion. Then Attorney General Alberto Gonzales claimed
15

543 U.S. 220 (2005).
551 U.S. 338, 347-50 (2007).
17
552 U.S. 38, 52-53 (2007).
18
Kimbrough v. United States, 552 U.S. 85, 101 (2007).
19
Carl Hulse & Adam Liptak, New Fight Over Controlling Punishments Is Widely Seen, N.Y.
T IMES, Jan. 13, 2005, at A29.
20
Patrick J. Fitzgerald, Testimony before the U.S. Sentencing Commission Regional Hearing in
Chicago, Illinois, at 3 (Sept. 10, 2009).
21
See Douglas A. Berman, Foreword: Beyond Blakely and Booker: Pondering Modern Sentencing Process, 95 J. C RIM . L. & C RIMINOLOGY 653, 676 (2005) (“Booker devised a new system
of federal sentencing which granted judges more sentencing power than they had ever previously
wielded”); Nancy Gertner, A Short History of American Sentencing: Too Little Law, Too Much Law,
or Just Right, 100 J. C RIM . L. & C RIMINOLOGY 691, 706 (2010) (“It is clear that Booker has
enhanced the position of the judge, whose sentencing expertise has been formally acknowledged
again, at the cost of diminishing the position of the Sentencing Commission.”); Luiza Ch. Savage,
Chaos Ahead After Sentencing Guidelines Decision, N.Y. S UN, Jan. 13, 2005, at 1 (quoting Frank
Bowman) (arguing that Booker resulted in “the most amount of judicial discretion ever afforded to
sentencing judges”).
22
See Frank O. Bowman, III, Debacle: How the Supreme Court Has Mangled American Sentencing Law and How It Might Yet Be Mended, 77 U. C HI . L. R EV. 367, 470 (2010) (“Kimbrough [and]
Gall ... have so thoroughly denatured appellate review that the federal system’s ability to control
regional and judge-to-judge sentencing disparity has been effectively eliminated”).
16
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that in light of “increasing disparity in sentences” since Booker, the Guidelines
needed to be fixed.23 As a potential “fix,” former Chair of the Sentencing Commission, Judge William K. Sessions III, has proposed “resurrecting” the mandatory
Guidelines in order to give them greater weight during sentencing.24 To comply
with Booker, Sessions suggests that aggravating facts on offense conduct be proven
by a jury beyond a reasonable doubt or admitted by the defendant, resulting in a
broad but mandatory sentencing range.25
On the other side of the debate, some scholars have suggested that Booker improved the “quality, transparency, and rationality” in federal sentencing, and thus
Booker is the “fix.”26 Indeed, the vast majority of federal district court judges
also indicate that they prefer the current advisory Guidelines system to alternative
regimes. In a 2010 Sentencing Commission survey of district court judges, 75%
of judges indicated that the current advisory Guidelines system “best achieves the
purposes of sentencing,” while only 3% preferred the mandatory Guidelines regime
in place before Booker.27
This Article asks how reintroducing greater judicial discretion after Booker has
impacted inter-judge sentencing disparities. This question is critical given the fact
that research suggested that the Guidelines themselves had reduced inter-judge sentencing disparities. Thus, it is imperative to understand whether weakening the effect of those Guidelines has reversed this trend. A finding of increased inter-judge
sentencing disparities implicates equity concerns because it suggests that similar
defendants convicted of similar crimes may receive different sentences due to the
mere happenstance of the sentencing judge assigned.
The primary empirical work on Booker’s impact on sentencing disparities suggests increases in inter-judge disparity. Using sentencing data from the District of
Massachusetts, Ryan W. Scott observes an increase in judge differences.28 While
23

Federal Sentencing Guidelines Speech (June 21, 2005), 17 F ED . S ENTENCING R EP. 324,
325-26 (2005).
24
William K. Sessions III, At the Crossroads of the Three Branches: The U.S. Sentencing Commission’s Attempts to Achieve Sentencing Reform in the Midst of Inter-Branch Power Struggles, 26
J.L. & P OL . 305, 346-50 (2011).
25
Id. at 346, 348.
26
See Amy Baron-Evans & Kate Stith, Booker Rules, 160 U. PA . L. R EV. 1631, 1633 (2012).
27
U.S. Sentencing Commission, R ESULTS OF S URVEY OF U NITED S TATES D ISTRICT J UDGES
JANUARY 2010 T HROUGH M ARCH 2010 (June 2010) (Question 19, Table 19).
28
See Ryan W. Scott, Inter-judge Sentencing Disparity After Booker: A First Look, 63 S TAN . L.
R EV. 1, 4-5 (2010). Scott finds almost a doubling of the effect of judge on sentence length post
Booker, resulting in an average difference of over two years between lenient and harsh judges for
cases not subject to a mandatory minimum. Id. at 40-41. Scott also finds significant variation in
the rate of below-range sentencing among judges. Some judges sentenced below-range at the same
rate prior to Booker (around 16%), while others increased their rate of sentencing below-range to
as high as 53%. Id. The Transactional Records Access Clearinghouse (TRAC) recently compiled
a dataset of the sentencing records of over 800 federal judges from fiscal year 2007 to 2011. See
Susan B. Long & David Burnham, TRAC Report: Examining Current Federal Sentencing Practices: A National Study of Differences Among Judges, 25 F ED . S ENTENCING R EP. 6, 7 (2012);
see also Big Sentencing Disparity Seen for Judges, N.Y. T IMES, March 5, 2012, at A23. Relying
on the random assignment of cases to judges within district courthouses, the TRAC study found
statistically significant, unexplained differences in the typical sentences of judges in over half of the
courthouses studied. Id. at 15. The most recent Commission report (2012) also finds suggestive evi-
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an important first step, the study is limited to ten judges in the Boston courthouse.
Therefore, a comprehensive analysis of disparities post Booker is essential to informing ongoing policy debates.29
This Article fills this gap by undertaking the first national, multi-district empirical analysis of inter-judge federal sentencing disparities after Booker by utilizing a
new and comprehensive dataset constructed for this study. The Article proceeds in
five parts. Part I provides a brief background of the legal landscape. Part II describes
the framework, dataset and empirical methods. Matching three data sources, I construct a dataset of approximately 400,000 criminal defendants linked to sentencing
judge from 2000-2009.
Part III presents empirical results. Relying on the random assignment of cases
to judges in district courthouses, I find evidence of significant increases in interjudge disparities. A defendant who is randomly assigned a one standard deviation
“harsher” judge in the district court received a 2.8 month longer prison sentence
compared to the average judge before Booker, but received a 5.9 month longer sentence following Kimbrough/Gall, a doubling of inter-judge disparities. Similarly,
a defendant randomly assigned to a one standard deviation more “lenient” judge
faced a 4.7% chance of receiving a below range departure before Booker, but over
6.9% chance after Kimbrough/Gall.
Part III.D analyzes the sources of increases in inter-judge disparities. Many
scholars have suggested that judges have different sentencing philosophies,30 which
dence that variation among judges within the same district, in particular the rates of non-government
sponsored below range sentences, has increased after Booker and Gall. United States Sentencing
Commission, R EPORT ON THE C ONTINUING I MPACT OF U NITED S TATES V. B OOKER ON F ED ERAL S ENTENCING 8 (2012). The Commission concludes that “sentencing outcomes increasingly
depend upon the judge to whom the case is assigned.” Id. at 7. However, the Commission does not
account for caseload composition differences across judges within the same district, and analyzes
all 94 districts, despite evidence by previous researchers that random assignment of cases is not
universal. Id. at 98. Thus, the Commission’s findings are only suggestive.
29
Another strand of empirical research analyzes the impact of Booker on racial disparities in
sentencing. The United States Sentencing Commission has found evidence of large racial disparities in sentencing outcomes after Booker. See United States Sentencing Commission, D EMO GRAPHIC D IFFERENCES IN F EDERAL S ENTENCING P RACTICES : A N U PDATE OF THE B OOKER
R EPORT ’ S M ULTIVARIATE R EGRESSION A NALYSIS (2010) (providing evidence that demographic
differences were significantly less when the Guidelines were binding, particularly during the PROTECT Act when appellate review of departures involved de novo review); United States Sentencing
Commission, F INAL R EPORT ON THE I MPACT OF U NITED S TATES V. B OOKER ON F EDERAL
S ENTENCING, at 105-108 (2006). However, other scholars have found no significant change in
racial disparities, at least in sentence length. See J.T. Ulmer et al., Racial Disparity in the Wake
of the Booker/Fanfan Decision: An Alternative Analysis to the USSC’s 2010 Report, 10 C RIM . &
P UB . P OL’ Y 1077 (2011). Some scholars argue that judicial discretion may actually mitigate recent
increases in racial disparities. See Joshua Fischman & Max Schanzenbach, Racial Disparities under
the Federal Sentencing Guidelines: The Role of Judicial Discretion and Mandatory Minimums, 9 J.
E MPIRICAL L EGAL S TUD . 729, 730-31 (2012) (arguing that recent increases in racial disparities
are mainly due to the increased relevance of mandatory minimums).
30
See John S. Carroll et al., Sentencing Goals, Casual Attributions, Ideology, and Personality,
52 J. P ERSONALITY & S OC . P SYCHOL . 107 (1987) (arguing that judicial ideology is reflected
in how a judge thinks about the causes of crime and the goals of sentencing); Shari S. Diamond &
Hans Zeisel, Sentencing Councils: A Study of Sentence Disparity and Its Reduction, 43 U. C HI . L.
R EV. 109, 114 (1975) (“it is reasonable to infer that the judges’ differing sentencing philosophies
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may be affected by standards of appellate review.31 Sentencing practices are correlated with judge demographic characteristics such as race,32 gender,33 and political
affiliation.34 In particular, the inevitable shift in the composition of the federal district courts may have profound consequences on unwarranted disparities as judges
who have no experience sentencing under a presumptive Guidelines regime take
the federal bench.35 Federal defense lawyer James Felman predicted that following
the introduction of the advisory Guidelines, “unwarranted disparity in the near term
would be considerably less than that which existed prior to 1987,” but “there will
be a minority of judges who will generate unwarranted disparity, and this number
seems likely to increase as the years go by and the bench is filled with individuals
are a primary cause of the disparity"); see also, Paul Hofer, Kevin Blackwell, & R. Barry Ruback,
The Effect of the Federal Sentencing Guidelines on Inter-Judge Sentencing Disparity, 90 J. C RIM .
L. & C RIMINOLOGY 239, 250 (1999) (claiming that there are differences between how liberals and
conservatives view the goals of sentencing which can drive different sentencing practices).
31
Joshua Fischman & Max Schanzenbach, Do Standards of Review Matter? The Case of Federal Criminal Sentencing, 40 J. L EG . S TUD . 405, 406 (2011). The authors find that Democratic
appointees are more lenient than Republican appointees and differences in sentencing practices increase when appellate review is more deferential, suggesting that judges are constrained by the fear
of reversal. The authors also find evidence that pre-Guidelines appointed judges are more likely to
depart from the Guidelines than post Guidelines appointees.
32
See T HOMAS U HLMAN, R ACIAL J USTICE : B LACK J UDGES AND D EFENDANTS IN AN U R BAN T RIAL C OURT 78-82 (1979) (claiming that black and white judges sentenced black defendants
more harshly compared to white defendants); Susan Welch et al., Do Black Judges Make a Difference?, 32 A M . J. P OL . S CI . 126, 134 (1988) (finding that black judges do not differ much in their
incarceration decisions from white judges based on one city’s criminal cases).
33
See, e.g., Darrell Steffensmeier & Chris Herbert, Women and Men Policy Makers: Does the
Judge’s Gender Affect the Sentencing of Criminal Defendants?, 77 S OCIAL F ORCES 1163 (1999)
(female judges sentence defendants for longer terms, are more likely to incarcerate minorities, and
less likely to incarcerate women, in Pennsylvania criminal cases); Max Schanzenbach, Racial and
Sex Disparities in Sentencing: The Effect of District-Level Judicial Demographics, 34 J. L EG .
S TUD . 57 (2005) (some evidence that minority and female judges sentence differently using district
level variation in judicial characteristics).
34
For instance, Max Schanzenbach & Emerson Tiller explore the impact of ideology on federal criminal sentencing decisions from 1992 through 2001. Max M. Schanzenbach & Emerson
H. Tiller, Strategic Judging Under the United States Sentencing Guidelines: Positive Theory and
Evidence, 23 J.L. E CON . & O RG . 24, 52-53 (2007). They find that sentences for serious crimes
in districts comprised of more Democrat appointed judges are lower than sentences in districts with
more Republican appointed judges. The alignment of the ideology of the reviewing court also increased departures from the Guidelines. More recent work in Max M. Schanzenbach & Emerson H.
Tiller, Reviewing the Sentencing Guidelines: Judicial Politics, Empirical Evidence, and Reform, 75
U. C HI . L. R EV. 715, 734 (2008) reveals that Republican appointed judges give longer sentences
for the same crime compared to their Democratic appointed counterparts. Moreover, Democraticappointed judges are more likely to depart downwards from the Guidelines when the reviewing
circuit court is majority Democratic appointed. Id. at 735.
35
Until now, prior studies have been unable to identify the impact of post Booker appointed
judges on inter-judge sentencing disparities. The Scott study, which only looks at the Boston courthouse, is unable to take into account changes in judicial composition because the Boston courthouse
did not experience turnover during the years in his study. Scott, supra note 28, at 25. Recent work
suggests that racial disparities in sentencing are greater among judges appointed after Booker than
among those who were appointed pre-Booker. See Crystal S. Yang, Free At Last? Judicial Discretion
and Racial Disparities in Federal Sentencing, Harvard John M. Olin Center for Law, Economics,
and Business Fellows’ Discussion Paper Series No. 47, 3 (2012).
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who have no history with binding guidelines.”36
I find that female judges and Democratic appointed judges issue shorter sentences and are more likely to depart downwards from the Guidelines than their
male and Republican appointed peers, respectively. Also striking are the differential sentencing practices of post Booker and pre-Booker judicial appointees. Judges
who have no prior experience sentencing under the mandatory Guidelines regime
are more likely to depart from the Guidelines recommended range than their preBooker counterparts, suggesting that newer judges are less anchored to the Guidelines.
This Article also contributes to the literature on geographical variations in sentencing patterns. Regional variations can affect sentencing through both exercise
of judicial discretion and regional policy differences among prosecutors.37 In Part
III.E, I present evidence of substantial inter-district differences in sentencing outcomes. Significant differences exist in sentence length, and rates of below range
departures, mandatory minimums, and substantial assistance motions, with interdistrict differences expanding after Booker.
In Part III.F, I present some evidence on how prosecutorial decisions contribute
to inter-judge disparities. Undoubtedly, a defendant’s sentence is determined by the
discretionary actions of multiple actors in the criminal justice process, culminating
in sentencing. Therefore, any study of inter-judge sentencing disparities is only a
partial portrayal of the disparities that can arise in the criminal justice system. Previous scholars rightly suggested that arrest, charge, and plea bargaining decisions
made earlier in the process are all ripe avenues for unwarranted bias.38
In particular, I analyze the impact of mandatory minimums on inter-judge disparities, largely unexplored by previous work. If charged prior to judge assignment,
36

See James Felman, How Should Congress Respond if the Supreme Court Strikes Down the
Federal Sentencing Guidelines?, 17 F ED . S ENTENCING R EP. 97, 98-99 (2004).
37
See, e.g., Paul L. Sutton, Federal Sentencing Patterns: A Study of Geographical Variations, 18
U.S. D EP ’ T. OF J UST. 7 (1978); William M. Rhodes & Catherine Conly, Department of Justice
Federal Justice Research Program, Analysis of Federal Sentencing (1981); Charles D. Weisselberg
& Terrence Dunworth, Inter-District Variation under the Guidelines: The Trees May Be More Significant Than the Forest, 6 F ED . S ENTENCING R EP. 25, 26-27 (1993) (finding that the Guidelines
do not impact all cases and all districts equally and that the Guidelines mean different things in
different contexts).
38
See, e.g., Franklin E. Zimring, Making the Punishment Fit the Crime, 6 H ASTINGS C ENTER
R EP. 13, 13-14 (1976) (arguing that there is “multiple discretion” in the criminal justice system
from the legislature, prosecutor, judge and parole board); Ilene H. Nagel & Steven J. Schulhofer,
A Tale of Three Cities: An Empirical Study of Charging and Bargaining Practices Under the Sentencing Guidelines, 66 S. C AL . L. R EV. 501, 502 (1992) (noting that “both Congress and the U.S.
Sentencing Commission were well aware that plea bargaining posed a potential threat to the success
of guidelines sentencing”). As a result, the Guidelines system has been attacked by many for its
rigidity and for shifting power to prosecutors in their charge and plea bargaining decisions. See,
e.g., Daniel J. Freed, Federal Sentencing in the Wake of the Guidelines: Unacceptable Limits on
the Discretion of Sentencers, 101 YALE L.J. 1681, 1719-20, 1725-27 (1992); Kate Stith, The Arc
of the Pendulum: Judges, Prosecutors, and the Exercise of Discretion, 117 YALE L.J. 1420, 1430
(2008); Albert W. Alschuler, Sentencing Reform and Prosecutorial Power: A Critique of Recent
Proposals for “Fixed” and “Presumptive” Sentencing, 126 U. PA . L. R EV. 550, 556-58 (1978);
K ATE S TITH & J OSE A. C ABRANES, F EAR OF J UDGING : S ENTENCING G UIDELINES IN THE
F EDERAL C OURTS 6 (1998).
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one would expect mandatory minimums to reduce inter-judge disparities.39 However, prosecutorial discretion can lead to disparate application of mandatory minimums across judges, potentially through the use of superseding indictments filed
after judge assignment to the case.40 Indeed, I find evidence that the application of
a mandatory minimum is a large contributor to inter-judge and inter-district disparities, such that measures of disparity are reduced by almost a factor of two when I
exclude cases in which mandatory minimums are charged. The results also indicate
substantial unequal application of mandatory minimums to similar cases within district courthouses, and different mandatory minimum policies by prosecutors across
district courts. There are also large differences in the rates of substantial assistance
motions filed by prosecutors across judges and district courts. Such results indicate
that prosecutorial charging is a measurable contributor to disparities in sentencing.
In Part IV, I describe recent proposals to reform federal sentencing and apply
this Article’s empirical findings to shed light on the soundness of these suggestions. Proposals include introducing jury fact-finding into a mandatory Guidelines
system, and a return to a simplified but presumptive Guidelines regime, both of
which would comport with the Court’s holding in Booker. While such proposals
may mechanically reduce the presence of inter-judge disparities, they would effectively bind judges to the charges brought by prosecutors. In light of the finding in
this Article that a substantial portion of inter-judge disparities and regional disparity may be attributable to the application of mandatory minimums, any proposal
that contemplates shifting power to prosecutors will likely exacerbate unwarranted
disparities. Indeed, many judges and scholars have suggested that mandatory minimums are “fundamentally inconsistent with the sentencing guidelines system.”41
Instead, I argue that strengthened appellate review and elimination of mandatory
minimums are potential steps in the direction of reducing unwarranted disparities
in sentencing. Part V concludes.

39

See infra Part III.F.
For instance, prosecutors often bring superseding indictments under various statutes, such as
21 U.S.C. §851 and 18 U.S.C. §924(c). A literature documents the large degree of prosecutorial
discretion in bringing superseding indictments and potential due process concerns. See, e.g., Donald
C. Smaltz, Due Process Limitations on Prosecutorial Discretion in Re-Charging Defendants: Pearce
to Blackledge to Bordenkircher, 36 WASH . & L EE L. R EV. 347, 353 (1979) (“Absent an adequate
justification for the superseding or additional charges, vindictiveness will be presumed.”).
41
See Sessions, supra note 24, at 329 (citing Senator Edward M. Kennedy, Sentencing ReformAn Evolutionary Process, 3 F ED . S ENTENCING R EP. 271, 272 (1991) (“Mandatory minimum
sentencing statutes have . . . hampered the guideline system and are becoming an increasingly
serious obstacle to its success. . . . Mandatory minimums inevitably lead to sentencing disparity
because defendants with different degrees of guilt and different criminal records receive the same
sentence.”)); Stephen Breyer, Federal Sentencing Guidelines Revisited, 11 F ED . S ENTENCING R EP.
180, 184-85 (1999) (“Congress, in simultaneously requiring Guideline sentencing and mandatory
minimum sentences, is riding two different horses. And those two horses, in terms of coherence,
fairness, and effectiveness, are traveling in opposite directions. . . . [Congress needs to] abolish
mandatory minimums altogether.”).
40
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B RIEF L EGAL BACKGROUND OF F EDERAL S ENTENCING

Adoption of the Federal Sentencing Guidelines

In the early twentieth century, criminal justice was premised on the notion of rehabilitation.42 This goal of rehabilitation manifested itself in the form of indeterminate sentencing, which allowed prison sentences and probation to be tailored to
each offender’s progress toward reform. As a result, judges and parole boards possessed substantial discretion in their sentencing determinations.43 In this regime
of “free at last” sentencing,44 federal judges had essentially unlimited authority in
imposing sentences, restrained only by statutorily prescribed minimum and maximum sentences.45 Lack of appellate review of sentences meant that judges faced no
meaningful check to ensure uniformity and consistency in sentencing.46
By the 1970s, faith in the rehabilitative model of sentencing declined due to a
confluence of changing social norms, escalating public anxiety over rising crime
rates, and public skepticism of the ability to rehabilitate criminal offenders.47 The
legal community and public expressed alarm at the widespread disparities in criminal sentencing. Some argued that judges and parole boards endangered public
safety with lenient sentencing of criminals.48 Others were distressed by inequitable
and arbitrary treatment within the criminal justice system as studies showed that
similar offenders were often punished very differently. A 1977 study of forty-seven
42

See David Rothman, Sentencing Reform in Historical Perspective, 29 C RIME & D ELIN 631, 637-41 (1983) (explaining that reformers “pursue[d] rehabilitation, which meant
treating the criminal not the crime, calculating the sentence to fit the individual needs and characteristics of the offender”); see also Frank O. Bowman, III, The Quality of Mercy Must Be Restrained,
and Other Lessons in Learning to Love the Federal Sentencing Guidelines, 1996 W IS . L. R EV. 679,
680-89 (describing the rehabilitative sentencing model).
43
See Rothman, supra note 42, at 638 (“[T]he judge would make his decision (probation or such a
minimum-maximum term); eventually the prison classification committee experts would make their
decision (this program or that program), and the parole board experts would make theirs (release at
the minimum, or later)”).
44
A term coined by Judge Nancy Gertner to describe the state of indeterminate sentencing prior
to 1984. See United States v. Mueffelman, 400 F. Supp. 2d 368, 372 (D. Mass 2005); United States
v. Jaber, 362 F. Supp. 2d 365, 370 (D. Mass. 2005).
45
See United States Sentencing Commission, T HE F EDERAL S ENTENCING G UIDELINES : A
R EPORT ON THE O PERATION OF THE G UIDELINES S YSTEM AND S HORT- TERM I MPACTS O N
D ISPARITY I N S ENTENCING , U SE OF I NCARCERATION , AND P ROSECUTORIAL D ISCRETION
AND P LEA BARGAINING at 9 (December 1991) (judges “decided the various goals of sentencing,
the relevant aggravating and mitigating circumstances, and the way in which these factors would
be combined in determining a specific sentence”); see also Koon v. United States, 518 U.S. 81, 96
(1996) (“Before the Guidelines system, a federal criminal sentence within statutory limits was, for
all practical purposes, not reviewable on appeal.”)
46
See, e.g., Dorszynski v. United States, 418 U.S. 424, 431 (1974) (stating the general proposition
that appellate review ends if a sentence is within the limitations set forth in the statute).
47
See, e.g., F RANCIS A. A LLEN, T HE D ECLINE OF THE R EHABILITATIVE I DEAL : P ENAL
P OLICY AND S OCIAL P URPOSE, 25-30 (1981); see also Bowman, Debacle, supra note 22, at 374
(attributing demand for social controls to rising crime rates and social upheaval).
48
See Michael Tonry, Obsolescence and Immanence in Penal Theory and Policy, 105 C OLUM .
L. R EV. 1233, 1247 (2005) (conservatives criticized indeterminate sentencing for being uncertain
and lenient and increasing crime rates).
QUENCY
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Virginia state district court judges revealed that while judges generally agreed on
the verdict in legal cases, they applied radically different sentences.49 A Federal
Judicial Center Second Circuit Study found large inter-judge differences in the sentences imposed based on identical presentence reports of defendants.50 The same
defendant was sentenced to three years by one judge, and twenty years by another.51
Some concluded that this disparate treatment of defendants by judges produced
racial inequities in sentencing, with judicial discretion resulting in higher sentences
for minorities and poor defendants.52 The American Friends Service Committee
claimed that decreasing discretion among judges and parole boards was the only
way to eliminate racial discrimination and sentencing disparities in the criminal
justice system.53
Other studies identified large inter-court differences. A 1988 study of federal
courts found that white collar offenders who committed similar offenses received
very different sentences depending on the court in which they were sentenced,54
with one study observing that “a defendant sentenced by a Southern judge was
likely to serve six months more than average, while a defendant sentenced in Central
California was likely to serve twelve months less.”55
These large disparities in sentencing prompted calls for sentencing reform. Championing the call for reform, federal district judge Marvin Frankel expressed grave
concern over the indeterminate and individualized sentencing regime of the period.56 Judge Frankel called for the creation of an independent sentencing commission that would replace judicial and parole board discretion.57
In response, Congress created the United States Sentencing Commission to
adopt and administer the Sentencing Guidelines, aimed at eliminating unwarranted
sentencing disparities “among defendants with similar records who have been found
guilty of similar criminal conduct.”58 Part of the SRA, the Guidelines were applied
to all federal offenses committed after November 1, 1987. Some have argued that
49

William Austin & Thomas A. Williams, III, A Survey of Judges’ Responses to Simulated Legal
Cases: Research Note on Sentencing Disparity, 69 J. C RIM . L. & C RIMINOLOGY 306, 308-10
(1977). In a marijuana possession case, some judges imposed prison terms while others only recommended probation. In a burglary case, recommended prison sentences ranged from thirty days
and a $100 fine, to five years in prison. Id. at 308-09.
50
See Partridge & Eldridge, supra note 2, at 36.
51
Id.
52
See Am. Friends Serv. Comm., Struggle for Justice: A Report on Crime and Punishment in
America 130 (1971).
53
See id. (claiming that discretion allowed judges and parole boards to control minority groups);
see also Bowman, Quality of Mercy, supra note 42, at 686-88 (explaining that critics argued that discretion produced unjustifiable disparities open to conscious or unconscious racial and other biases,
demanding “truth in sentencing”).
54
S TANTON W HEELER ET AL ., S ITTING IN J UDGMENT: T HE S ENTENCING OF W HITE C OLLAR C RIMINALS (1988).
55
See Stephen Breyer, Federal Sentencing Guidelines Revisited, 11 F ED . S ENTENCING R EP.
180, 180 (1988).
56
Frankel, supra note 3, at 5. Frankel also argued that individualized sentencing was “out of
hand,” and criticized the state of indeterminate sentencing. Id. at 10, 26-49; see also Marvin E.
Frankel, Lawlessness in Sentencing, 41 U. C IN . L. R EV. 1 (1972).
57
Frankel, supra note 3.
58
28 U.S.C. §991(b)(1)(B).
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the SRA itself preserved judicial discretion,59 while most view the Commission as
having substantially increased the severity of punishment and dramatically reduced
judges’ discretion to consider the particular circumstances of each offender.60
Notwithstanding disagreement about the degree to which sentencing reform
changed the legal landscape, the new SRA introduced a shift from a regime of virtually unfettered judicial discretion to more restricted discretion within a system of
determinate sentencing.61 By requiring judges to sentence within the recommended
Guidelines range unless the court found aggravating or mitigating circumstances,62
the Guidelines were presumptively mandatory, although the particular standards for
departure were ambiguous.63 Later in Koon v. United States, the Supreme Court
clarified that a district court judge’s decision to depart from the Guidelines range
would be subject to an abuse of discretion standard of appellate review.64
Under the Guidelines, federal district court judges assign each federal crime
to one of forty-three offense levels, and assign each federal defendant to one of
six criminal history categories. The more serious the offense and the greater the
harm associated with the offense, the higher the base offense level assigned under
Chapter Two of the Guidelines.65 For example, trespass offenses are assigned a base
offense level of four,66 while kidnapping is assigned a base offense level of thirtytwo.67 From a base offense level, the final offense level is calculated by adjusting for
applicable offense characteristics and adjustments. Relevant adjustments include
the amount of loss involved in the offense, use of a firearm, and the age or condition
of the victim.68 Chapter Three of the Guidelines allows for further adjustments
based on aggravating or mitigating factors, such as a defendant’s acceptance of
responsibility.69
The criminal history category reflects the frequency and severity of a defen59

Marc L. Miller & Ronald F. Wright, Your Cheatin’ Heart(land): The Long Search for Administrative Sentencing Justice, 2 B UFF . C RIM . L. R EV. 725, 752 (1999).
60
See Stith & Koh, supra note 5, at 284-85 (“It should come as a surprise to no one that in those
areas where the statute is ambiguous or otherwise deliberately leaves important policy issues to the
Commission, the Commission has generally chosen to increase the rigidity and complexity of its
guidelines. It is no accident that judges have found it difficult to depart from the guidelines; this is
precisely what Congress intended.”).
61
In addition to creating the Guidelines, the SRA also abolished federal parole and instituted
supervised release in its place. Comprehensive Crime Control Act of 1984, Pub.L. 98-473, ch. II,
§218(a)(5), 98 Stat. 2027 (1984). Supervised release is meant “to assist individuals in their transition
to community life,” and “fulfills rehabilitative ends, distinct from those served by incarceration.”
United States v. Johnson, 529 U.S. 53, 59 (2000). The term of supervised release is imposed along
with a prison term at the time of sentencing. United States Sentencing Commission, Guidelines
Manual, §5D1.1(a).
62
H.R. Rep. No. 1017, 98th Congress, 2d Session, at 93-94 (1984).
63
See Miller & Wright, supra note 59, at 730 (The Commission allowed judges to depart from
the Guidelines when the case fell outside the “heartland,” but the concept was left highly general.)
64
518 U.S. 81, 99 (1996). The Court in Koon stated that Congress “did not intend, by establishing limited appellate review, to vest in appellate courts wide-ranging authority over district court
sentencing decisions.” Id. at 97.
65
United States Sentencing Commission, Guidelines Manual, Chapter Two.
66
Id. §2B2.3.
67
Id. §2A4.1.
68
Id.
69
For instance, the Guidelines allow for a decrease in base offense level for a defendant’s accep-
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dant’s prior criminal convictions. To determine a defendant’s criminal history category, a judge adds points for prior sentences in the federal system, fifty state systems, all territories and foreign or military courts.70 For example, three points are
added for each prior sentence of imprisonment exceeding one year and one month,
and two points are added for each prior sentence of imprisonment of at least 60 days
and less than one year and one month.71 Two points are also added if the defendant
committed the instant offense while already under a criminal justice sentence.72
The intersection of the final offense level and criminal history category yields
a fairly narrow Guidelines recommended sentencing range, where the top of the
range exceeds the bottom by the greater of either six months or 25%. If a judge
determines that aggravating or mitigating circumstances warrant a departure from
the Guidelines, she would have to justify her reasons for departure to the appellate
court,73 but in general the Guidelines were treated as effectively mandatory prior to
Booker.74 After the imposition of a sentence, the government is permitted to appeal
any sentence resulting in a departure below the Guidelines range, and the defendant
can appeal an upward departure.75
There are numerous other ways in which Congress has attempted to limit unwarranted disparities in sentencing. Beginning in 1984, and subsequently in 1986
and 1988, Congress enacted a series of mandatory minimum statutes directed at
drug and firearms offenses.76 Mandatory minimums were also applied to recidivist offenders, through the Armed Career Criminal Act,77 enhancements for career

tance of responsibility under §3E1.1 or for minimal participation in the offense under §3B1.2. Base
offense level is increased for defendants who obstruct or impede the administration of justice under
§3C1.1.
70
United States Sentencing Commission, Guidelines Manual, Chapter 4, Part A (“A defendant
with a record of prior criminal behavior is more culpable than a first offender and thus deserving of
greater punishment. Greater deterrence of criminal conduct dictates that a clear message be sent to
society that repeated criminal behavior will aggravate the need for punishment with each recurrence.
To protect the public from further crimes of the particular defendant, the likelihood of recidivism
and the future criminal behavior must be considered. Repeated criminal behavior is an indicator of
a limited likelihood of successful rehabilitation.”).
71
Id. §4A1.1.
72
Id. §4A1.1.
73
18 U.S.C. §3553(b) (“[T]he court shall impose a sentence of the kind, and within the range,
referred to in subsection (a)(4) unless the court finds that there exists an aggravating or mitigating
circumstance of a kind, or to a degree, not adequately taken into consideration by the Sentencing
Commission in formulating the guidelines that should result in a sentence different from that described").
74
The Court in Booker noted that “[t]he Guidelines as written ... are not advisory; they are
mandatory and binding on all judges” and therefore “have the force and effect of laws.” Booker, 543
U.S. at 233.
75
18 U.S.C. §3742 (a)-(b).
76
Anti-Drug Abuse Act of 1986 (Pub. L. 99-570, 100 Stat. 3207); Pub. L. No. 98-473, §1005(a),
98 Stat. 1837, 2138-39 (1986).
77
18 U.S.C. §924(e); Guidelines Manual §4B1.2. The Armed Career Criminal Act (ACCA)
imposes a minimum 15-year term of imprisonment for defendants convicted of unlawful possession
of a firearm under 18 U.S.C. §922(g), with three prior state or federal convictions for violent felonies
or serious drug offenses. 18 U.S.C. §924(e).
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offenders,78 and enhancements for repeat and dangerous sex offenders.79
In 2003, Congress passed the PROTECT Act to curtail judicial departures due
to a concern that the standard for appellate review of departures had led to undesirably high rates of downward departures for child sex offenses.80 Under the Feeney
Amendment to the PROTECT Act, judicial departures were only allowed for certain
reasons outlined in the Guidelines Manual.81 Additionally, the Feeney Amendment
to the PROTECT Act replaced the prior abuse of discretion standard of review for
downward departures with de novo review, thus overturning the Supreme Court’s
holding in Koon.
B.

Challenges to the Mandatory Guidelines Regime

The initial challenge to the federal sentencing regime began with the “watershed”
ruling in Apprendi v. New Jersey.82 In Apprendi, the Supreme Court found a New
Jersey hate crime statute unconstitutional because it authorized judges to impose
higher sentences based on facts other than those submitted to a jury, and proved
beyond a reasonable doubt.83
These principles were subsequently applied to the constitutionality of mandatory sentencing guidelines, first questioned in reference to the Washington State
Sentencing Guidelines. In Blakely v. Washington, the Supreme Court held that the
Sixth Amendment right to a jury trial prohibited judges from increasing a defendant’s sentence beyond the statutory maximum based on facts other than those decided by the jury beyond a reasonable doubt.84 As a result, Washington’s mandatory
sentencing guidelines were struck down.85 While the majority opinion in Blakely
emphasized that the decision was not passing judgment on the constitutionality of
the Federal Sentencing Guidelines,86 the parallels were apparent and shortly after,
the Court applied its reasoning in Blakely to the Guidelines.
In United States v. Booker, the Court held that the mandatory Federal Sentencing Guidelines violated the Sixth Amendment by mandating judicial fact-finding
in determining sentencing ranges.87 The Booker ruling, however, did not apply to
78

28 U.S.C. §944(h) (mandating that the Commission impose imprisonment “at or near the maximum term authorized” for defined “career” offenders); Guidelines Manual §4B1.1.
79
18 U.S.C. §§2247, 2426; Guidelines Manual §4B1.5;
80
Pub. L. 108-21, 117 Stat. 650, S. 151, 2003.
81
For certain offenses, such as child abduction and child sex offenses, the PROTECT Act
amended 18 U.S.C. §3553(b) to only allow the sentencing court to depart downwards if there are
mitigating circumstances of a kind or to a degree that has been “affirmatively and specifically identified” as permissible grounds for downward departure. The PROTECT Act also amended the Guidelines Manual §5K2.0 to state that the “the grounds enumerated in this Part K of Chapter Five are
the sole grounds that have been affirmatively and specifically identified as a permissible ground of
departure.”
82
530 U.S. 466, 425 (2000) (O’Connor, J., dissenting) (calling the Apprendi decision a“watershed
change in constitutional law”).
83
Id. at 468-69, 490.
84
542 U.S. 296 (2004).
85
Id.
86
See id. at 305, n.9 (“The Federal Guidelines are not before us, and we express no opinion on
them”).
87
543 U.S. 220, 226-27, 243-44 (2005) (Stevens, J., writing for the Court). In Booker, a federal
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Congressionally-enacted mandatory minimum sentences.88 Rather than invalidate
the Guidelines wholly, or prescribe an enhanced role for jury fact-finding, the Court
held in a separate remedial decision led by Justice Breyer, that the remedy for the
Sixth Amendment violation was to declare the Guidelines no longer mandatory but
“effectively advisory.”89 The Court explained that “district courts, while not bound
to apply the Guidelines, must consult those Guidelines and take them into account
when sentencing.”90
In the immediate aftermath of Booker, district courts took varied approaches in
applying Booker.91 Some courts sentenced with minimal consideration of the applicable Guidelines range, while others treated the Guidelines as a dominant factor.92
Circuit courts later reached a consensus that sentencing must begin with the calculation of the applicable Guidelines range.93 Today, after a sentencing judge has
calculated the applicable Guidelines range, he or she must consider seven factors
before imposition of punishment: (1) the nature and circumstances of the offense
and the history and characteristics of the defendant, (2) the need for the sentence
imposed, (3) the kinds of sentences available, (4) the kinds of sentence and the
sentencing range established, (5) any pertinent policy statement issued by the Sentencing Commission, (6) the need to avoid unwarranted sentence disparities among
defendants with similar records who have been found guilty of similar conduct, and
district court judge enhanced the defendant Booker’s sentence under the Guidelines based on facts
determined by the judge. The judge found by a preponderance of the evidence that the defendant had
distributed additional amounts of crack cocaine and that the defendant obstructed justice. Booker
appealed and the Seventh Circuit ruled that the Guidelines violated the Sixth Amendment in light of
Blakely. United States v. Booker, 375 F.3d 508 (7th Cir. 2004). A few months later, the Supreme
Court, in a 5-4 opinion delivered by Justice Stevens, held that the Guidelines violated the Sixth
Amendment by allowing judges to unilaterally enhance sentences using facts not reviewed by juries.
88
See U.S. S ENTENCING C OMMISSION, R EPORT TO C ONGRESS : M ANDATORY M INIMUM
P ENALTIES IN THE F EDERAL C RIMINAL J USTICE S YSTEM, at 37 (Oct. 2011) (discussing the
compatibility of mandatory minimums and the Guidelines after Booker).
89
Booker, 543 U.S. at 245 (Breyer, J., writing for the Court). Similarly, the provisions on supervised release also became advisory, although the Commission states that the majority of courts
continue to impose at least the minimum terms in Guidelines Manual, §5D1.2.
90
Booker, 543 U.S. at 264.
91
See Gilles R. Bissonnette, “Consulting” the Federal Sentencing Guidelines After Booker, 53
UCLA L. R EV. 1497, 1521-22 (2006) (arguing that Booker left open how much sentencing judges
could deviate from the Guidelines).
92
See id. at 1522-32 (claiming that district courts have taken two approaches in applying Booker,
the “substantial-weight” approach and the “consultative” approach). For an example of the two type
of approaches taken by district courts, see, e.g., United States v. Ranum, 353 F. Supp. 2d 984, 987
(E.D. Wis. 2005) (noting that “Booker is not ... an invitation to do business as usual,” but that courts
should consider all the factors in §3553(a)); cf. United States v. Wilson, 350 F. Supp. 2d 910, 925
(D. Utah 2005) (suggesting courts give “heavy weight” to the Guidelines after Booker).
93
See, e.g., United States v. Howard, 454 F.3d 700, 703 (7th Cir. 2006) (court noting that after
Booker, “the district court must first calculate the proper Guidelines range and then, by reference
to the factors specified in 18 U.S.C. §3553(a), select an appropriate sentence”); United States v.
Crosby, 397 F.3d 103, 113-114 (2d Cir. 2005) (“[C]onsideration of the Guidelines will normally
require determination of the applicable Guidelines range, or at least identification of the arguably
applicable ranges ... it would be a mistake to think that, after Booker/Fanfan, district judges may
return to the sentencing regime that existed before 1987 and exercise unfettered discretion to select
any sentence within the applicable statutory maximum and minimum”).

Inter-Judge Disparities After Booker

15

(7) the need to provide restitution to any victims of the offense.94 After considering
the above factors, the sentencing judge is instructed to “impose a sentence sufficient,
but not greater than necessary, to comply with” the basic goals of sentencing.95
Subsequent Supreme Court decisions furthered weakened the effect of the Guidelines on criminal sentencing. While the Court in Booker declared that departures
from the Guidelines should be reviewed under a “reasonableness” standard,96 it did
not clarify the meaning of this standard until a sequence of decisions in 2007. In
Rita v. United States, the Court held that a sentence within the Guidelines recommended range could be presumed “reasonable” because a “judge who imposes a
sentence within the range recommended by the Guidelines thus makes a decision
that is fully consistent with the Commission’s judgment in general.”97 In Gall v.
United States, the Court further held that federal appeals courts could not presume
that a sentence outside the range recommended by the Guidelines was unreasonable, reducing the degree of appellate review.98 The Court in Gall concluded that
in reviewing a sentence outside the Guidelines range, an appellate court could consider the extent of deviation from the Guidelines, but must give “due deference to
the district court’s decision that the §3553(a) factors, on a whole, justify the extent of the variance.”99 In the aftermath of Gall, appellate courts could only review
sentencing decisions under the more deferential abuse of discretion standard. Concurrent with the Gall decision, the Supreme Court confirmed the holding in Booker
as applied to cases involving possession, distribution and manufacture of crack cocaine.100 The Court in Kimbrough held that federal district court judges have the
discretion to impose sentences outside the recommended Guidelines range on the
basis of policy disagreements with the Sentencing Commission.101
Ultimately, federal sentencing as it stands today is a mere remnant of the preApprendi era. Fundamentally altering the state of sentencing, the Court in Booker
struck down the long-standing mandatory Guidelines as violative of the Sixth Amendment right to a jury trial. Today, a district court judge calculates the applicable
Guidelines sentence, but has the discretion to deviate from the Guidelines recommendation, with departures from the Guidelines reviewed under an abuse of discretion standard. The reduced role of the Guidelines has led many to speculate on
whether federal judges will be “free at last,” returning to the state of indeterminate
sentencing that spurred the adoption of the Guidelines over two decades ago.

94

18 U.S.C. §3553(a).
Id.
96
Booker, 543 U.S. at 260-63.
97
551 U.S. 338, 347-50 (2007) (holding that “a court of appeals may apply a presumption of
reasonableness to a district court sentence that reflects a proper application of the Sentencing Guidelines”).
98
552 U.S. 38, 50-51 (2007).
99
Id. at 51 (arguing the an appellate court’s disagreement with the appropriateness of a sentence
is “insufficient to justify reversal”).
100
Kimbrough, 552 U.S. at 85.
101
Id. (granting sentencing judges explicit permission to deviate from the Guidelines based on
disagreement with the disparate treatment of crack and powder cocaine offenses - the so called
“100-to-1 ratio”).
95
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F RAMEWORK , DATA , AND M ETHODS

Judicial Behavior in Criminal Sentencing

While judges have an obligation to “follow the law,”102 they have additional motivations that affect their decision-making.103 Scholars have suggested that judges
care about a variety of factors such as public recognition, leisure, and reputation.104
In addition, judges have preferences for sentencing according to their personal
tastes.105 In the context of criminal sentencing, a judge may prefer to sentence a
defendant based on personal, political or ideological goals, rather than according to
the mandated Guidelines sentence.106
How might the choice of sentencing regime affect judicial behavior? Given
judges’ individual preferences for sentencing, one would likely observe large interjudge disparities if judges were left unconstrained in the exercise of discretion.
Consistent with this prediction, scholars have suggested that the large variances in
federal sentences prior to the adoption of the Guidelines were likely due to differing judicial attitudes regarding rehabilitation and deterrence.107 Conversely, judges
who are restricted in the exercise of discretion would be unable to fully sentence
according to their preferences. For instance, the adoption of determinate sentencing
102

See Lewis A. Kornhauser, Judicial Organization and Administration, 7 Encyclopedia of Law
and Economics 27, 29 (2000)
103
The economic analysis of judicial behavior builds on work by Judge Richard A. Posner. See,
e.g., Richard A. Posner, Judicial Behavior and Performance: An Economic Approach, 32 F LA .
S T. U. L. R EV. 1259 (2005); see also R ICHARD A. P OSNER, H OW J UDGES T HINK (2008);
L EE E PSTEIN , W ILLIAM M. L ANDES & R ICHARD A. P OSNER, T HE B EHAVIOR OF F EDERAL
J UDGES : A T HEORETICAL AND E MPIRICAL S TUDY OF R ATIONAL C HOICE (2013). See Nicola
Gennaioli & Andrei Shleifer, Judicial Fact Discretion, 37 J. L EG . S TUD . 1 (2008) for a theoretical
economic model of judicial discretion in fact determination.
104
Federal district judges occupy a unique position because most district judge appointments are
terminal, thus “insulat[ing] the judges from the normal incentives and constraints that determine the
behavior of rational actors, except for the relative handful of judges who are ambitious for promotion
to the court of appeals.” Posner, Judicial Behavior and Performance: An Economic Approach, supra
note 103, at 1260, 1269 (noting that a judge likely cares more about leisure and public recognition
relative to income, compared to average practicing attorneys).
105
Id. at 1269-70 (“deciding a particular case in a particular way might increase the judge’s utility
just by the satisfaction that doing a good job produces ... [or] by advancing a political or ideological
goal”).
106
Indeed, federal district court judges have expressed a great degree of dissatisfaction with the
Guidelines. In a 2010 survey of federal district judges, 65% of judges indicated that they thought
the departure policy statements in the Guidelines Manual were too restrictive, suggesting that many
judges would prefer to deviate from the Guidelines. U.S. Sentencing Commission, R ESULTS OF
S URVEY OF U NITED S TATES D ISTRICT J UDGES JANUARY 2010 T HROUGH M ARCH 2010 (June
2010), (Question 14, Table 14).
107
See Posner, Judicial Behavior and Performance: An Economic Approach, supra note 103, at
1270 (inferring from the “extraordinary variance” in federal sentences prior to the promulgation of
the Guidelines that differences in sentence lengths were due to judicial attitudes on responsibility
and deterrence); see also Brian Forst & Charles Wellford, Punishment and Sentencing: Developing
Sentencing Guidelines Empirically From Principles of Punishment, 33 RUTGERS L. R EV. 799, 80104 (1981) (documenting disagreement between judges regarding five goals of sentencing: general
deterrence, special deterrence, incapacitation, rehabilitation, and just deserts).
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under the Guidelines introduced a mechanism by which to constrain judges, likely
explaining reduced inter-judge sentencing disparity after the promulgation of the
Guidelines.108
The prospect of appellate review further restricts judges’ sentencing discretion.
Judges who depart from the Guidelines incur economic and social costs from deviating. A high reversal rate is not only administratively burdensome, but also potentially harms a trial judge’s prospects for promotion to the appeals court.109 Indeed,
under the mandatory sentencing regime, departures from the Guidelines were relatively rare.110 After the Feeney Amendment of the PROTECT Act, which subjected
departures from the Guidelines to de novo review, departures were reduced even
further, suggesting that judges respond to changes in appellate scrutiny.111
Given the countervailing forces of (1) judge sentencing preferences versus (2)
costs of exercising discretion, how, theoretically, should Booker, Rita, Gall, and
Kimbrough affect inter-judge disparities? Immediately following Booker, the total
cost of exercising discretion fell substantially for judges who wanted to depart from
the Guidelines because the Guidelines were rendered advisory. This major shift in
sentencing may have been accompanied by increases in inter-judge disparity.
However, to the extent that the relative cost associated with the prior de novo
appellate review was still binding, judges may have been hesitant to alter their practices without further clarification of standards of review. Indeed, not until Rita,
Gall, and Kimbrough did the Court explicitly reduce the level of appellate review
to abuse of discretion, intuitively lowering the probability of appellate reversal.112
Thus, one might expect further increases in inter-judge disparities following Rita,
Gall, and Kimbrough. Nevertheless, given the Rita presumption of reasonableness
attached to within range sentences, the Guidelines still provide a safe harbor from
appellate scrutiny. Thus, judges may have continued adhering to the Guidelines in
making sentencing decisions
There are other reasons why judicial behavior and inter-judge disparities may
not have changed much after Booker and its progeny. First, judges may have become acculturated to the Guidelines if they have had substantial experience sen108

See supra notes 10-14.
See Posner, Judicial Behavior and Performance: An Economic Approach, supra note 103, at
1270-71; see also Stephen J. Choi, Mitu Gulati, & Eric A. Posner, What do Federal District Judges
Want?: An Analysis of Publications, Citations, and Reversals, University of Chicago John M. Olin
Law & Economics Working Paper Series Paper No. 508, at 3-4 (2009) (explaining that judges care
about minimizing workload and maximizing reputation by avoiding appellate reversal); Evan H.
Caminker, Precedent and Prediction: The Forward-Looking Aspects of Inferior Court Decisionmaking, 73 T EX . L. R EV. 1, 77-78 (1994) (describing anecdotal evidence that lower court judges dislike
being reversed on appeal due to professional reputation, advancement, judicial power); Richard S.
Higgins & Paul H. Rubin, Judicial Discretion, 9 J. L EGAL S TUD . 129, 130 (1980).
110
The rate of departure from the Guidelines was less than 15% in the early 1990s.
111
Recall that the Commission found that demographic differences under the mandatory Guidelines regime were lower during the PROTECT Act. See supra note 28.
112
The probability of reversal on sentencing matters fell from 36% in 2006 (under de novo review),
to 26% in 2008 (under abuse of discretion review). I calculate rate of appellate reversals using yearly
data on the universe of criminal appeals from the United States Sentencing Commission. Reversal is
defined as all reversals and remands on appeals arising out of Booker sentencing issues. According
to the United States Sentencing Commission, in 2012, sentences that had been appealed on the
grounds of unreasonableness were affirmed 95% of the time.
109
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tencing under the previous Guidelines regime.113 Acculturation would suggest that
judges with greater exposure to Guidelines sentencing would be less likely to depart
from the Guidelines in the aftermath of Booker.
Another potential mechanism is anchoring, a type of cognitive bias in which
decision-makers rely heavily on one piece of information and fail to make rational adjustments.114 Judge Nancy Gertner of the District of Massachusetts predicted
that the Guidelines would still play a predominant role for all judges post Booker
because “appellate courts have insisted that district court judges begin with - effectively, ‘anchor’ their decisions - in the Guidelines before considering anything
else.”115 Thus, to the extent that federal district judges are effectively anchored to
the Guidelines, one may not observe much deviation in sentencing practices after
Booker. Indeed, because district courts continued to calculate the applicable Guidelines range in the aftermath of Booker, scholars commented in the year following
Booker that the federal sentencing system remained virtually unchanged.116
B.

Sentencing Data

This Article provides the first comprehensive empirical evidence on the impact of
Booker and its progeny on inter-judge sentencing disparities. As noted previously,
the Scott study presents the only empirical evidence on these trends thus far, but is
limited to the 2,262 cases sentenced by ten judges who served continuously from
2001 to 2008 in the Boston courthouse of the District of Massachusetts.117 While
Scott’s study represents a first step in characterizing the extent to which inter-judge
sentencing practices have changed in the aftermath of Booker, a single courthouse

113

See Nancy Gertner, Supporting Advisory Guidelines, 3 H ARV. L. P OL’ Y R EV. 261, 262 (2009)
(“[A]fter twenty years of strict enforcement, the Federal Sentencing Guidelines have a gravitational
pull on sentencing and are likely to shape the way judges view sentencing, even if they are now
only advisory. Indeed, the greatest danger is not that judges will exercise their new discretion,
but that they will not.”); Stith, The Arc of the Pendulum, supra note 38, at 1496-97 (“[I]ncumbent
sentencing decision makers may be reluctant to regard as unreasonable the sentences they were
obliged to seek and impose for two decades”); Frank O. Bowman, Beyond Band-Aids: A Proposal
for Reconfiguring Federal Sentencing After Booker, 2005 C HI . L EGAL F. 149, 187 (2005) (arguing
that advisory guidelines might still constrain judicial discretion “if for no other reason than that the
federal bench has become acculturated to the Guidelines over the last seventeen years”).
114
See, e.g., Amos Tversky & Daniel Kahneman, Judgment Under Uncertainty: Heuristics and
Biases, 185 S CIENCE 1124, 1130-31 (1974); see also Birte Englich et al., Playing Dice with Criminal Sentences: The Influence of Irrelevant Anchors on Experts’ Judicial Decision Making, 32 P ER SONALITY & S OC . P SYCHOL . B ULL . 188, 188 (2006) (experimental results showing that criminal
sentences were higher if participants were confronted with a randomly high rather than a low anchor).
115
See Judge Nancy Gertner, What Yogi Berra Teaches About Post-Booker Sentencing, 115 YALE
L.J. P OCKET PART (2006) 137, 138-40 (describing the Guideline Manual as a “ready-made anchor”).
116
See Douglas A. Berman, Tweaking Booker: Advisory Guidelines in the Federal System, 43
H OUSTON L. R EV 341, 349 (2006) (“[A] culture of guideline compliance has persisted after
Booker”). Berman also suggests that Commission data in the year after Booker indicates that “federal sentencing judges are exercising their new discretion relatively sparingly.” Id. at 351.
117
Scott, supra note 28, at 17.
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is likely unrepresentative of other courthouses across the United States.118 As a result, the presence of growing inter-judge sentencing disparities after Booker in the
Boston courthouse may be the result of the particular caseload and judicial composition of that court, making conclusions that Booker has increased inter-judge
sentencing disparities likely not generalizable across other courts. In fact, a comparison of the Boston courthouse to other district courthouses reveals that the former
experienced a greater increase in inter-judge disparities following Booker than the
average court in the nation.119
Prior empirical research on inter-judge disparity and the impact of judicial demographics on sentencing practices has been hampered by the lack of judge identifiers in available data.120 Because cases are generally randomly assigned to judges
within a district courthouse, judge identifiers allow one to compare judges within
the same court and in the same time period, capturing judge differences in sentencing rather than differences in caseloads.121 However, the Sentencing Commission data does not identify the sentencing judge.122 In response, most researchers
have resorted to using aggregate district-level variation in judicial demographics to
control for judge sentencing preferences,123 but this methodology is flawed if districts with different judicial compositions differ in ways that affect all judges within
the district.124 A few researchers have resorted to hand matching sentencing data
from the Sentencing Commission with Public Access to Court Electronic Records
(PACER), but due to the intensive matching process, sample sizes under this method
have been severely limited.125
This Article is the first in over twenty-five years to match sentencing data to
judge identifiers in all 94 district courts, allowing for a comprehensive look at interjudge sentencing disparities after Booker. In order to overcome the lack of judge
identifiers in sentencing data, I use data from three sources: The United States
Sentencing Commission, the Transactional Records Access Clearinghouse, and the
Federal Judicial Center. I describe each dataset in turn.
United States Sentencing Commission - I use data from the United States Sen118

See supra note 37 for a discussion of the large geographical differences in sentencing and
Guidelines treatment.
119
Results available upon request to author.
120
The Anderson et al. study is the only empirical work with comprehensive sentencing data with
judge identifiers in the past twenty-five years. See Anderson et al., supra note 10, at 287.
121
According to the Administrative Office of the United States Courts, “The majority of courts
use some variation of a random drawing.” See http://www.uscourts.gov/Common/FAQS.aspx.
122
U.S. S ENTENCING C OMMISSION, G UIDE TO P UBLICATIONS & R ESOURCES 2007-2008 45
(2007), available at http://www.ussc.gov/publicat/Cat2005.pdf (“Pursuant to the policy on public
access to Sentencing Commission documents and data, all case and defendant identifiers have been
removed from the data.” (internal citation omitted)).
123
Schanzenbach & Tiller, Strategic Judging, supra note 34 (relying only on district-level variation in observable characteristics of judges).
124
For instance, a district with a greater percentage of Democratic judges could be different from
other districts. It may be that both Democratic and Republican judges within the district sentence
differently from judges in other districts, so any effect cannot be solely attributable to Democratic
judges.
125
See Schanzenbach & Tiller, Reviewing the Sentencing Guidelines: Judicial Politics, Empirical
Evidence, and Reform, supra note 34, at 728-30; Scott, supra note 28, at 15-16 (describing the
PACER method used to match records to sentencing data).
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tencing Commission (USSC) on records of all federal offenders sentenced pursuant
to the Sentencing Guidelines and Policy Statements of the SRA of 1984 in fiscal
years 2000 to 2009 (October 1, 1999 to September 30, 2009). The USSC provides
detailed sentencing data on federal defendants, but defendant and judge identifiers
are redacted.126 The dataset contains information from numerous documents on every offender: Indictment, Presentence Report, Report on the Sentencing Hearing,
Written Plea Agreement (if applicable), and Judgment of Conviction.
Court characteristics include the district court and circuit in which sentencing
occurred, in addition to the sentencing month and year.127 Demographic variables
include defendant’s race, gender, age, citizenship status, educational attainment,
and number of dependents. The primary offense variable is the primary offense
type for the case generated from the count of conviction with the highest statutory
maximum.128 Data is also available on whether the offense carries a mandatory
minimum sentence under various statutes, and whether departures from the statutory minimum are granted, either under a substantial assistance motion or application of the safety valve. Offense level variables include the base offense level, the
base offense level after Chapter Two adjustments and the final offense level after
Chapter Three adjustments. Criminal history variables include whether the defendant has a prior criminal record (first time offender or prior offender), and whether
armed career criminal status, career offender status, or repeat and dangerous sex
offender status is applied.129
For each offender, there is a computed Guidelines range, and a Guidelines range
adjusted for applicable mandatory minimums. Sentencing outcomes include imprisonment or probation, sentence length, and length of supervised release. Based
on departure status variables, I construct indicator variables for above range and
below range departures from the Guidelines.130
Transactional Records Access Clearinghouse - The Transactional Records Access Clearinghouse (TRAC) provides less comprehensive sentencing records obtained from detailed federal records and information from the Justice Department
and the Office of Personnel Management. TRAC provides an especially useful set
of data: while defendant, offense characteristics and Guidelines application information are not included, defendant sentences are linked to sentencing judge.131
126

Over 90% of felony defendants in the federal criminal justice system are sentenced pursuant to
the SRA of 1984 and all cases are assessed to be constitutional.
127
USSC data prior to 2004 includes information on the exact sentencing day, but this variable is
not available in later years. Information is also collected on the Guidelines amendment year used in
calculations. All results are robust to controlling for amendment year, although the results presented
in this paper do not include this control.
128
There are a total of 35 offense categories in the dataset. The most common offense is drug
trafficking, followed by immigration, fraud, firearms, and larceny. Summary statistics on federal
defendants are available upon request.
129
Data is also collected on the total number of criminal history points applied and the final criminal history category.
130
An above range departure is defined as 1 for a defendant who received an upward departure
from the maximum Guidelines recommended range. Similarly, a below range departure is defined as
1 for a defendant who received a downward departure from the minimum Guidelines recommended
range.
131
TRAC has compiled records on the criminal cases and the civil matters handled by federal dis-
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Federal Judicial Center - Finally, I obtain demographic information on federal
district court judges from the Federal Judicial Center. As of January 2014, there
are a total of 677 authorized Article III district judgeships.132 The number of federal district judgeships in each district court varies. The largest district court is
the Southern District of New York with twenty-eight authorized judgeships.133 The
majority of other district courts have between two to seven district court judgeships.134 I collect information on judge race, gender, affiliation of appointing president, tenure, whether the judge was appointed prior to the adoption of the Guidelines in 1987, and whether the judge was appointed after Booker was decided in
2005.
C.

Merging

In order to connect defendants to judges, I merge observations across these three
datasets. First, I match sentencing records from the USSC to TRAC data. By district court, matching is conducted on several key variables that can uniquely identify records: sentencing year, sentencing month, offense type,135 sentence length
in months, probation length in months, amount of monetary fine, whether the case
ended by trial or plea agreement, and whether the case resulted in a life sentence.136
Then, I match the USSC and TRAC combined data to judge biographical data from
the Federal Judicial Center. I successfully match approximately 60% of all USSC
cases from fiscal years 2000-2009, resulting in a merged dataset of 373,340 cases
representing 91 district courts (“full sample”).137
D.

Testing for Random Assignment

In an ideal experiment to test the impact of Booker, one would randomly allocate the
treatment - sentencing under an advisory Guidelines - to certain groups of judges.
In this hypothetical, a group of judges within each district court would be randomly
assigned to the treatment group, while the others would comprise the control group
(sentencing under a mandatory Guidelines regime). Because of the random assignment of the “Booker treatment,” any differences in caseload composition or judge
characteristics would be on average the same across both treatment and control
trict court judges in each of the 94 federal judicial districts through over 20 years of FOIA requests.
A description of TRAC is available at http://trac.syr.edu/aboutTRACgeneral.html.
132
As of January 2014, seventy-six positions are vacant. Authorized judgeships only refer to
full-time, non-senior status judges.
133
Statistics on authorized judgeships by district court are available at
http://www.uscourts.gov/JudgesAndJudgeships.
134
Id.
135
Data from USSC are coded to correspond with the offense categories in the TRAC data.
136
These match variables are comparable to those used by previous scholars under the PACER
method. See Schanzenbach & Tiller, Reviewing the Sentencing Guidelines, supra note 34, at 729
(matching USSC data with PACER records on date and length of the sentence, and when necessary,
the amount of any fine, the offense type, and the Hispanic ethnicity of the defendant).
137
The Federal Judicial Center does not collect demographic information on judges in three districts: Guam, Virgin Islands, and Northern Mariana Islands. See History of the Federal Judiciary,
available at http://www.fjc.gov.
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groups. As a result, a straightforward comparison of the sentencing practices between judges in the treatment group (those who sentence under an advisory Guidelines), and the judges in the control group (those who sentence under a mandatory
Guidelines), would capture the causal effect of greater judicial discretion via Booker
on inter-judge differences in sentencing.
Unfortunately, this hypothetical experiment does not exist because the Supreme
Court’s decision in Booker applied to all judges. However, one can utilize the quasiexperiment created by the timing of the Booker decision. Assuming that judges
within the same district courthouse are randomly assigned cases from the same underlying caseload, one can compare inter-judge disparities before Booker to interjudge disparities after Booker. If there are no other contemporaneous changes that
affect inter-judge sentencing, an increase in inter-judge disparities is attributable to
changes in judicial behavior, rather than underlying differences in case composition.138 Moreover, random assignment of cases can also lead to estimates of the
relationships between judicial demographics such as gender and experience, and
sentencing practices.
The crucial assumption underlying the validity of the quasi-experiment is the
random assignment of cases to judges.139 According to the Administrative Office
of the United States Courts, “[t]he majority of courts use some variation of a random drawing” as prescribed by local court orders.140 While each district court is
authorized to specify its own methods of case assignment,141 “[m]ost district and
bankruptcy courts use random assignment, which helps to ensure a fair distribution
of cases and also prevents ‘judge shopping,’ or parties’ attempts to have their cases
heard by the judge who they believe will act most favorably.”142
However, random assignment may be violated in some instances. For example, senior status judges with reduced caseloads may select the type of cases they
hear during the year,143 and some courts assign certain types of cases to particu138

Previous research indicates that Booker, and in particular Rita, Gall, and Kimbrough did have
a causal impact on judicial behavior, after controlling for unobservable year and monthly changes
that might affect sentencing. See Yang, supra note 35, at 17-18.
139
As mentioned previously, the Anderson et al., Hofer et al., Scott, and TRAC studies all rely on
random case assignment. See supra notes 10-14.
140
See http://www.uscourts.gov/Common/FAQS.aspx.
141
Under 28 U.S.C. §137, “[t]he business of a court having more than one judge shall be divided
among the judges as provided by the rules and orders of the court. The chief judge of the district
court shall be responsible for the observance of such rules and orders, and shall divide the business
and assign the cases so far as such rules and orders do not otherwise prescribe.” For example, in the
Arizona district court, “the Clerk must assign criminal cases to District Judges within each division
by automated random selection and in a manner so that neither the Clerk nor any parties or their
attorneys will be able to make a deliberate choice of a particular Judge.” AZ. L. R. Crim. 5.1(a).
Similarly, in the Northern District of California, “[c]ases shall be assigned blindly and at random by
the clerk by means of a manual, automated or combination system approved by the judges of the
court.” CA General Order No. 44. In Colorado,“[t]he clerk shall maintain a computerized program
to assure random and public assignment of new cases on an equal basis among the judicial officers.”
D.C. Colo. L Civ R 40.1.
142
For a description of judge assignment methods, see the Federal Judicial Center FAQS, available
at http://www.fjc.gov/federal/courts.nsf/.
143
28 U.S.C. §294 governs the assignment of cases to senior status judges. See, e.g., MA General
Order 10-04 §4.2 (“A senior judge may limit the category of cases assigned to him or her or may
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lar judges.144 Moreover, even if a court has local rules and orders that specify the
use of random assignment, empirically testing for random assignment is important
because random assignment can be violated if individuals seek to game the system.145 For instance, prosecutors might seek to tilt the scales by indirectly steering
criminal cases towards particular judges viewed as favorably disposed towards the
government.146
In order to dispose of potential violations to random case assignment, I empirically test for random assignment. To begin, I employ several sample restrictions.
First, I drop judges who were formally retired prior to the beginning of the dataset
in 2000 to remove the possibility of non-random assignment to senior status judges
who continued to hear cases during the sample period. Second, I drop judges and
district courthouses with annual caseloads of fewer than twenty-five cases in order
to obtain a sufficient number of cases per judge for statistical power.147 Finally, I
drop district courthouses with only one active judge.
With this restricted sample, I test for random assignment using the merged
USSC, TRAC, and Federal Judicial Center data from 2000-2009.148 If cases are
randomly assigned to judges, then judges should see, on average, cases with the
same distribution of predetermined defendant characteristics. I test random assignment based on five fixed defendant characteristics: gender, age, a black race indicator, number of dependents, and an indicator for education (specifically, education of
select a special category of cases for assignment. For example, a senior judge may elect not to be
assigned criminal cases or may elect to be assigned only patent cases.”)
144
For instance, the Southern District of New York assigns civil and criminal cases such that
all judges, “except the chief judge, shall be assigned substantially an equal share of the categories of cases of the court over a period of time. There shall be assigned or transferred
to the chief judge such matters as the chief judge is willing and able to undertake, consistent
with the chief judge’s administrative duties.” See United States District Court for the Southern
District of New York, Rules for the Division of Business Among District Judges, available at
http://www.nysd.uscourts.gov/rules/rules.pdf, at 102. Thus, assignment is based on equal caseload,
rather than pure random assignment, and the chief judge is exempted from the rules. See id.
145
See J. Robert Brown Jr. & Allison Herren Lee, Neutral Assignment of Judges at the Court of
Appeals, 78 T EXAS L. R EV. 1037, 1041-43 (2000) (describing nonrandom assignment in federal
courts of appeals).
146
See United States v. Pearson, 203 F.3d 1243, 1264 (10th Cir. 2000) (“If a judge receives case assignments not through some neutral system, but rather because of prosecutors’
opinion that he or she is more favorably disposed to the government’s arguments than another
judge in the same district, then a judge’s caseload might be based in part on prosecutors’ evaluations of judicial performance.”). For recent allegations of “gaming” the random assignment
system, see William Safire, Essay; Norma The Plumber, N.Y. T IMES, July 31, 2000, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2000/07/31/opinion/essay-norma-the-plumber.html (alleging that
the Chief Federal Judge of the U.S. District Court (U.S.D.C.) went “off the wheel” to assign a
politically sensitive case in a non-random fashion). For another example, see Dan Fitzpatrick,
Bank of America Manages to Avoid Judge Rakoff, WALL S T. J., May 17, 2010, available at
http://online.wsj.com/article/SB10001424052748703699804575247132437874588.html (describing the non-random assignment of a Bank of America case in the Southern District of New York).
147
Results are robust to choice of caseload minimums, but follow the convention in prior literature.
The Scott study excludes judges who imposed fewer than 25 sentences in a two year period. See
Scott, supra note 28, at 17. Similarly, Anderson et al. exclude judges who sentence fewer than 30
cases during a two year period. Anderson et al., supra note 10, at 287.
148
See Appendix A for details.
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less than a high school degree).149 Intuitively, there should be no significant correlation between a particular judge and defendant characteristics if cases are randomly
assigned.150 I drop all courthouses that violate random assignment,151 resulting in a
subsample of 156 courthouses from seventy-four district courts representing about
50% of all linked cases in district courts from 2000-2009, for a total of 158,126
cases (“random sample”).152
E.

Trends in Sentencing

I first present graphical evidence of trends in sentence lengths and rates of below
range departures over the time period 2000-2009. Graphical analyses confirm that
Booker did significantly alter the sentencing practices of judges. Figure 1 below
presents a graph of average sentence lengths in months over time, with the timing
of Booker delineated by the first vertical dash and Kimbrough/Gall by the second
vertical dash, along with predicted trend lines before and after Booker. Figure 1 indicates that overall sentence lengths were relatively stable in the five years prior to
Booker, but began to decrease afterwards, particularly for cases in which a mandatory minimum was not charged.153

149

For each of the five defendant characteristics, I regress the characteristic on district courthouse
by sentencing year fixed effects, sentencing month fixed effects and judge fixed effects. I test the
hypothesis of no judge effects (the null hypothesis) using an F-test for whether the judge fixed
effects are equal to zero. I employ seemingly unrelated regression (SUR). For a discussion of the
SUR technique, see David H. Autor & Susan N. Houseman, Do Temporary-Help Jobs Improve
Labor Market Outcomes for Low-Skilled Workers? Evidence from “Work First”, 2 AEJ: Applied
Economics 96, 106-107 (2010). See Appendix A, Table A1.
150
Randomization results are robust to non-parametric permutation tests.
151
It is important to note that my tests of randomization may result in exclusion of courthouses
that do not actually violate random assignment. Due to the nature of the USSC data, each defendant
is listed as a separate observation, rather than each case, the unit of randomization. Therefore,
district courthouses with large numbers of related, or multi-defendant cases, may look nonrandom,
although they in fact use random case assignment.
152
All results presented are robust to using the full sample, and are available upon request.
153
Cases defined as excluding mandatory minimums are those in which a statutory mandatory
minimum was not charged, which represent over two-thirds of all cases.
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F IGURE 1. S ENTENCE L ENGTHS IN M ONTHS
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Notes: Data is from the USSC 2000-2009 on all defendants. Data points are monthly averages.

Figure 2 presents a graph of the average rate of below range departures from
2000-2009, that is, the percentage of cases in which the defendant receives a sentence below the Guidelines recommended minimum sentence. Figure 2 reveals a
trend of decreasing rates of below range departures before Booker, characterized by
particularly low relative rates of departures in the PROTECT Act era. The decreasing trend in below range departures reversed after Booker, which induced a sudden
jump in the rate of departure, and the new increasing trend continued throughout
Rita, Gall, and Kimbrough until the rate of below range departures returned to prePROTECT era levels.
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F IGURE 2. B ELOW R ANGE D EPARTURE R ATES
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Below range departures can be the product of both prosecutorial and judicial
action. To disentangle these two factors, Figure 3 presents trends in the average
rate of below range departures that are not the result of a government sponsored
substantial assistance motion.154 Figure 3 indicates a similar trend with respect to
rates of non-government sponsored below range departures, suggesting that judicial
behavior has changed following the shift to an advisory Guidelines regime. However, while overall trends in sentencing have changed in the aftermath of Booker,
and its progeny Rita, Gall, and Kimbrough, aggregate trends mask whether interjudge variation has increased. For this reason, I next examine inter-judge disparities
in these outcomes.

154

As noted previously, a substantial assistance motion by the government permits a departure
from the Guidelines for a defendant who provides substantial assistance in the prosecution or investigation of another person. See 18 U.S.C. §3553(e); Guidelines Manual, §5K1.1
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F IGURE 3. N ON -G OVERNMENT S PONSORED B ELOW R ANGE D EPARTURES
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F.

Measuring Inter-Judge Disparity: Analysis of Variance

To identify changes in inter-judge disparity, I employ an analysis of variance methodology. Variants of this methodology have been used in the federal sentencing literature,155 as well as in the economics literature on teacher value added.156 The
analysis of variance technique measures inter-judge dispersion in sentencing outcomes based on the variance of a judge-specific random variable.157
155

Studies using a similar methodology include Anderson et al., supra note 10; Joel Waldfogel,
Aggregate Inter-Judge Disparity in Sentencing: Evidence from Three Districts, 4 F ED . S ENTENC ING R EP. 151 (1991); Abigail Payne, Does Inter-judge Disparity Really Matter? An Analysis of the
Effects of Sentencing Reforms in Three Federal District Courts, 17 I NT ’ L J. L AW & E CON . 337
(1997).
156
See Raj Chetty et al., How Does Your Kindergarten Classroom Affect Your Earnings? Evidence
from Project Star, 126 Q. J. E CON . 1593, 1595-96 (2011).
157
This paper does not employ the statistical technique used by Scott. See Scott, supra note
28. Scott regresses sentencing outcomes on dummy indicators for each sentencing judge, such that
the corresponding R-squared measures the percentage of variance in the dependent variable that is
explained by sentencing judge identity. Id. at 58. The author interprets an increase in the R-squared
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The analysis of variance technique assumes that the impact of a judge on sentencing outcomes is randomly and normally distributed within each district courthouse such that the judge effect has mean of 0 and variance of σ 2 .158 For instance,
suppose that there are n judges in a district courthouse. If the judges were identical in their sentencing preferences, and cases are randomly assigned to judges,
there would be no impact of a particular judge on sentencing outcomes. Each judge
would sentence in the exact same way and variation in the judge effect, as measured
by σ 2 , would equal zero. To the extent that judges do differ in their sentencing
practices based on personal ideologies or goals, one would observe a distribution of
judge effects, as measured by the standard deviation in judge effects, σ. The greater
the inter-judge variation in outcomes, the larger σ.
Analysis of variance allows one to estimate the standard deviation of judge effects on sentence length, σ, after controlling for case and defendant characteristics. For example, a finding that σ = 5 implies a defendant who is assigned to
a judge that is one standard deviation “harsher” than the average judge receives
a five month longer sentence. In order to capture changes in inter-judge disparity, this paper measures σ in periods before Booker and after Booker. Specifically,
I separate the sample timeframe of 2000-2009 into four main periods: (1) Koon
(October 1999 to April 2003), (2) PROTECT Act (May 2003 to January 2005),159
(3) Booker (January 2005 to November 2007), and (4) Kimbrough/Gall (December
2007 to September 2009).160 An increase in σ after Booker implies an increase in
inter-judge sentencing disparity after the Guidelines were rendered advisory.

in time periods following Booker as indicative of growing inter-judge disparities. Id. at 40-41.
For instance, with regards to sentence lengths for cases excluding mandatory minimums, the author
finds an increase in R-squared from 0.014 pre-Booker to 0.080 post Kimbrough/Gall. Id. at 34 tbl 2.
However, Scott’s reliance on the R-squared measure is problematic for two main reasons. First, the
measure of R-squared does not have a straightforward interpretation in terms of actual inter-judge
variation, in contrast to a measure of the variance in a judge-specific random variable. Second,
the magnitude of an R-squared cannot be taken literally without some discussion of its statistical
significance, which is proxied by the linear regression model’s significance. Scott’s linear regression
models are often statistically insignificant, suggesting that judge fixed effects are a poor predictor
of sentencing outcomes. Id. at 40 tbl 3. Despite this insignificance, Scott does not qualify the
magnitudes of the R-squared measures. For instance, the model is statistically insignificant in two
out of three of the studied periods in Table 2, and four out of five of the studied periods in Table 3. Id.
at 34-40. In contrast, measures of inter-judge variance in an analysis of variance can be rigorously
tested for statistical significance. Scott acknowledges this issue, noting that “[t]he fact that the
model for the Kimbrough/Gall period is not significant reinforces the need for caution in interpreting
the results for cases not governed by a mandatory minimum.... Although the relationship in the
Kimbrough/Gall period is strongly positive, the model falls well short of statistical significance.” Id.
at 34-35 n. 177.
158
See Appendix B for details on the empirical methodology used here.
159
The PROTECT Act became effective as of April 30, 2003.
160
Booker was decided on January 12, 2005, and Kimbrough/Gall were decided on December 10,
2007. Although the USSC data only contains information on sentencing month and year, the data
is coded to denote which January 2005 cases were pre and post Booker and which December 2007
cases were pre and post Kimbrough/Gall.
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R ESULTS ON I NTER - JUDGE AND R EGIONAL D ISPARITIES

This next section presents empirical findings on inter-judge sentencing disparities
in different time periods from 2000-2009. In Parts III.A-C, I explore disparities
in three main sentencing outcomes: sentence length, below range departures, and
above range departures, respectively. Then, in Part III.D, I explore potential sources
of increasing disparities by analyzing changes in judge sentencing practices by demographic characteristics. In Part III.E, I analyze whether disparities have also
increased regionally across district courts. Finally, in Part III.F, I consider to what
extent prosecutors contribute to measures of inter-judge disparities.
A.

Sentence Length

The following graphs present boxplots of the average sentence length imposed by
each judge relative to the average sentence length of the district courthouse in which
the judge sits.161 A boxplot captures the distribution of judge sentencing practices,
with a more narrow spacing of the boxplot evidencing less inter-judge disparity.
In particular, the top and bottom of the box capture the spread between the 75th
percentile and 25th percentile mean judge effect, also known as the interquartile
range (IQR). More extreme judge effects are represented in the whiskers of the
boxplot. The greater the IQR, the larger the inter-judge disparity within district
courts.
The first panel of Figure 4 indicates that more than half of judges are sentencing
within a few months of the average courthouse mean, with some outliers in both
directions. However, the spread of the distributions over the four time periods indicates an increase in the distribution of judge average sentence lengths relative to
the court mean following Kimbrough/Gall. The spread between the 25th and 75th
percentile (IQR) expands modestly but noticeably from Koon to Kimbrough/Gall.
If anything, the PROTECT Act period appears to be characterized by larger
inter-judge differences than during Koon. Recall that during the PROTECT Act period, the Guidelines were still mandatory and judges were subject to de novo appellate review. One might therefore expect measures of disparities to be lowest during
this period. However, the direct effect of the PROTECT Act was to reduce judgeinitiated below range departures, rather than differences in overall sentence length.
Moreover, as I show in Part III.F, infra, measures of judge disparities necessarily
capture both judge-induced differences as well as prosecutor-induced differences
across cases, which are difficult to disentangle.
Note, however, that some of the inter-judge disparities may be attributable to
uneven applications of mandatory minimums by prosecutors. The second panel of
Figure 4 presents distributions of average judge sentences for those cases in which a
mandatory minimum was not charged, approximately two-thirds of all cases. These
cases better represent disparities more likely attributable to judicial behavior. Judge
161

Case composition likely varies across district courts. Thus, I use a measure of judge sentence
length that is comparable across all districts, which can be accomplished by calculating average
sentence length by judge relative to the mean district courthouse sentence. All boxplots exclude
outside values, defined as values that fall outside 1.5 times the interquartile range.
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differences from the courthouse mean are smaller in this subset of cases, but disparities appear to grow larger following Booker. As the figure shows, after Kimbrough
and Gall, judge sentence lengths begin to depart more from court averages, compared to the Koon period.
F IGURE 4. AVERAGE J UDGE S ENTENCE L ENGTHS IN M ONTHS
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Notes: Data is from the random sample 2000-2009.

Statistical analysis of variance confirms the graphical patterns. Table 1 presents
a measure of σ for sentence lengths, the causal impact of being randomly assigned
a one standard deviation “harsher” judge in the sentencing district courthouse.162
Each measure of σ is also accompanied by a 95% confidence interval, which indicates the statistical probability that the true measure of σ lies within the interval
range. During the Koon period in which the Guidelines were binding and judges
were governed by an abuse of discretion standard of appellate review, a defendant
assigned to a “harsher” judge received a 2.8 month longer sentence than similar defendants sentenced by an average judge in the courthouse. By the time of the PROTECT Act, a defendant randomly assigned to a harsher judge received a 2.5 month
162

Table 1’s analysis includes all defendants that are sentenced, including those who received
probation (or sentence lengths of zero).
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longer sentence. Inter-disparities increased following Booker, such that Booker and
Kimbrough/Gall induced a doubling of inter-judge disparity compared to the Koon
period. A harsher judge sentenced a defendant 4.8 months longer than the court
average in the immediate aftermath of Booker and over 5.9 months longer after
Kimbrough and Gall.
The second panel of Table 1 excludes from the analysis those cases in which
a mandatory minimum was charged. A one standard deviation “harsher” judge
sentenced a defendant to 1.6 months more than the court average during Koon, and
2.5 months longer during the PROTECT Act period. Inter-judge disparity for nonmandatory minimum cases remains at 2.5 months during Booker, rising up to 3.2
months after Kimbrough and Gall. Changes in σ are not statistically significant from
the PROTECT Act to Kimbrough and Gall. However, inter-judge disparities are
significantly larger following Gall/Kimbrough compared to the Koon period, more
than doubling.163 This evidence suggests that even in cases in which mandatory
minimums were not charged, inter-judge disparities have increased significantly.
Interestingly, the estimates of σ in the bottom panel are almost halved compared
to those presented in the top panel where all sentences are included. These results
indicate that inter-judge disparities are much larger in the subset of cases in which
mandatory minimums are charged. This finding could be attributable to either larger
judge differences among types of cases with eligible mandatory minimums, such as
drug and firearms offenses, and/or disparate application of mandatory minimums by
prosecutors. Results presented later in Part III.F, infra, suggest the latter explanation
is at play.

163

A formal statistical analysis of whether σ is statistically significant from one period to another
relies on the chi-squared distribution. However, an easier and more informal (albeit conservative)
way of assessing significance is to look at whether the confidence intervals of σ overlap. That
is, if the lower bound of σ in one period is greater than the upper bound of σ in another period,
the estimates of σ are statistically significant from one another, suggesting a measurable change in
disparity.
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TABLE 1. I NTER - JUDGE VARIATION IN S ENTENCE L ENGTHS
A LL S ENTENCES
Period
σ
Lower bound Upper bound No. Obs.
Koon
2.818
2.262
3.511
66150
PROTECT Act
2.505
1.349
4.651
22469
Booker
4.833
3.951
5.914
35132
Kimbrough/Gall 5.952
4.853
7.299
22431
E XCLUDING M ANDATORY M INIMUMS
Period
σ
Lower bound Upper bound
Koon
1.560
1.191
2.043
PROTECT Act
2.474
1.704
3.592
Booker
2.546
1.974
3.283
Kimbrough/Gall 3.240
2.496
4.207

No. Obs.
44403
15400
22056
13571

Notes: Data is from the random sample from 2000-2009. All regressions contain demographic controls
and controls for offense type, offense level, and criminal history. Regressions also contain sentencing
year fixed effects, sentencing month fixed effects, and district courthouse fixed effects.

Table 2 presents evidence of inter-judge variation in the decision to incarcerate, disentangling the decision to incarcerate from the sentence length decision.164
Given that Booker rendered the Guidelines advisory, a judge could potentially impose no prison sentence on a defendant, even if the Guidelines recommended minimum was non-zero. Interestingly, Table 2 reveals that inter-judge disparity has
not significantly increased throughout the four time periods. During Koon, a one
standard deviation “harsher” judge was 2.7% more likely to incarcerate than the
courthouse average. The effect fell to 2.2% during the PROTECT Act, 1.8% during
Booker, and rose back to 2.7% following Kimbrough/Gall.
TABLE 2. I NTER - JUDGE VARIATION IN I NCARCERATION R ATE
A LL S ENTENCES
Period
σ
Lower bound Upper bound No. Obs.
Koon
.0275
.0232
.0326
66150
PROTECT Act
.0225
.0166
.0307
22469
Booker
.0178
.0131
.0243
35132
Kimbrough/Gall .0267
.0209
.0339
22431
Notes: Data is from the random sample from 2000-2009. All regressions contain demographic controls
and controls for offense type, offense level, and criminal history. Regressions also contain sentencing
year fixed effects, sentencing month fixed effects, and district courthouse fixed effects.

B.

Below Range Departures

Inter-judge disparities have also increased in the rate of below range departures post
Booker. Figure 5 shows boxplots of average rates of below range departures by
164

I define incarceration as a binary indicator, where 1 indicates that the defendant has received a
sentence, and 0 indicates no sentence imposed. Defendants who do not received a prison sentence
often pay fines and serve probationary periods.
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judge, relative to the district courthouse mean, which comprise approximately forty
percent of cases. The rate of below range departures in the aggregate was lowest
during the PROTECT Act period (Figure 2), and the top panel of Figure 5 suggests
that the distribution of judge below range departures was also more compressed
during the PROTECT Act compared to Koon. These results are consistent with the
intended effect of the PROTECT Act, which was targeted at reducing below range
departures. However, inter-judge deviations from the court mean expand visibly
following Booker and Kimbrough/Gall. Figure 5 suggests that increasing interjudge disparities in sentence length as described in Part III.A are partly attributable
to growing inter-judge disparities in the rate of below range departures.
F IGURE 5. AVERAGE J UDGE R ATES OF B ELOW R ANGE D EPARTURES
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Notes: Data is from the random sample 2000-2009.

Table 3 confirms these graphical trends. The top panel of Table 3 presents results
including all sentences. During the Koon period, a defendant who was assigned to a
judge one standard deviation more “lenient” than the average judge was 4.7% more
likely to be sentenced below the Guidelines recommended minimum.165 During
165

Here, I define a judge who sentences defendants at greater rates below range as more “lenient.”
Leniency is used solely to connote a tendency to impose shorter sentence lengths.
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the PROTECT Act, a similar judge was 4.1% more likely to sentence below range.
Following Booker, the “lenient” judge’s practices deviated more greatly from the
courthouse average, with a 6.9% rate immediately following Booker and 6.9% rate
after Kimbrough/Gall. The increased likelihood of below range departures following Booker and Kimbrough/Gall is statistically significant from the Koon-era rate
and PROTECT Act rate, revealing markedly higher inter-judge disparities.166
Excluding cases with mandatory minimums reveals a very similar trend, with
the one standard deviation more “lenient” judge being 4.5% more likely to sentence below range during Koon, rising to 7.4% following Booker. Note that the
magnitudes of σ when all sentences are included (top panel), and when mandatory
minimums are excluded (bottom panel), are very similar. This finding suggests
that inter-judge disparities in below range departures are real and substantial, and
not the mere product of mandatory minimums. If anything, measures of inter-judge
disparity are lower in most periods when mandatory minimums are included. Recall
that a mandatory minimum which exceeds the Guidelines recommended minimum
trumps the latter minimum, becoming the statutorily binding minimum, thus potentially reducing inter-judge disparity. The findings suggest that the application of
mandatory minimums may yield the appearance of inter-judge consistency.167
TABLE 3. I NTER - JUDGE VARIATION IN B ELOW R ANGE D EPARTURES
A LL S ENTENCES
Period
σ
Lower bound Upper bound
No. Obs.
Koon
.0470
.0402
.0549
66150
PROTECT Act
.0413
.0322
.0530
22469
Booker
.0689
.0595
.0799
35132
Kimbrough/Gall .0689
.0578
.0821
22431
E XCLUDING M ANDATORY M INIMUMS
Period
σ
Lower bound Upper bound
Koon
.0451
.0375
.0544
PROTECT Act
.0436
.0325
.0585
Booker
.0739
.0627
.0870
Kimbrough/Gall .0627
.0495
.0793

No. Obs.
44403
15400
22056
13571

Notes: Data is from the random sample from 2000-2009. All regressions contain demographic controls and
controls for offense type, offense level, and criminal history. Regressions also contain sentencing year fixed
effects, sentencing month fixed effects, and district courthouse fixed effects.

Not only do mandatory minimums confound the accurate determination of interjudge disparities, so do below range departures that are government sponsored,
166

Looking at the top panel of Table 3, the 95% confidence interval of σ during Koon is (.0402,
.0549) and the confidence interval of σ during Kimbrough/Gall is ( .0578, .0821). Note that the two
confidence intervals do not overlap, indicating that inter-judge disparities are significantly larger
following Kimbrough/Gall compared to Koon.
167
See Scott, supra note 28, at 26 (“[M]andatory minimums may interfere with accurate assessment of inter-judge sentencing disparity by creating the illusion of inter-judge consistency.”).
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which occur in approximately 15% of cases.168 Figure 6 thus presents boxplots of
average rates of below range departures by judge, relative to the district courthouse
mean, excluding below range departures that are government sponsored. Here, the
changes in judge distributions follow the expected pattern. Judge deviations from
the court mean were lowest during the PROTECT Act, which specifically focused
on restricting non-government sponsored below range departures. After Booker,
judge deviations in non-government sponsored below range departures expand, and
persist through Kimbrough/Gall.
F IGURE 6. AVERAGE J UDGE R ATES OF B ELOW R ANGE D EPARTURES N ON -G OVT S PONSORED
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Table 4 analyzes inter-judge variation in this subset of below range departures
that are judicially initiated, rather than the result of a government substantial assistance motion. Table 4 indicates that the increasing inter-judge disparities in
below range departures evidenced in Table 3 persist in this subset of departures.
Inter-judge disparities increased from 4.4% during Koon to 7.6% after Booker and
168

I define government sponsored below range departures as those that arise from a substantial
assistance motion under either 18 U.S.C. §3553(e) or Guidelines Manual, §5K1.1.
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Kimbrough/Gall, with the lowest inter-judge disparities during the PROTECT Act.
Inter-judge disparities similarly increased throughout the period for the subset of
cases not subject to a mandatory minimum, from 4.4% during Koon to over 7.4%
after Booker. These results indicate that in the subset of departures that are most
likely attributable to judicial behavior, the PROTECT Act was not only associated
with the lowest aggregate rates of downward departures, but also the lowest interjudge disparities.
TABLE 4. I NTER - JUDGE VARIATION IN B ELOW R ANGE D EPARTURES
N ON -G OVERNMENT S PONSORED D EPARTURES
A LL S ENTENCES
Period
σ
Lower bound Upper bound
No. Obs.
Koon
.0438
.0372
.0515
52736
PROTECT Act
.0371
.0290
.0473
18552
Booker
.0759
.0661
.0871
28723
Kimbrough/Gall .0755
.0638
.0894
18331
E XCLUDING M ANDATORY M INIMUMS
Period
σ
Lower bound Upper bound
Koon
.0441
.0365
.0533
PROTECT Act
.0374
.0273
.0514
Booker
.0743
.0632
.0873
Kimbrough/Gall .0676
.0541
.0845

No. Obs.
38019
13548
19540
12131

Notes: Data is from the random sample from 2000-2009. All regressions contain demographic controls
and controls for offense type, offense level, and criminal history. Regressions also contain sentencing
year fixed effects, sentencing month fixed effects, and district courthouse fixed effects.

C.

Above Range Departures

Inter-judge disparities have also increased in the rate of above range departures,
which comprise approximately 2% of cases. Figure 7 presents the distribution of
average rates of above range departures by judge, relative to their district courthouse
mean, for incarcerated defendants. The graphs reveal an expansion in the distribution of above range departure rates within district courts, particularly between the
25th and 75th percentile of the distribution. Increased inter-judge deviations are
also reflected in the rate of above range departures for cases with no mandatory
minimums charged. The spread between the 25th and 75th percentile following
Kimbrough/Gall is visibly larger compared to pre-Booker spreads.
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F IGURE 7. AVERAGE J UDGE R ATES OF A BOVE R ANGE D EPARTURES
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Table 5 presents measures of inter-judge variation from the analysis of variance
and reveals significant and substantial increases in inter-judge disparities in above
range departures. In the top panel where all sentences are analyzed, a one standard
deviation “harsher” judge was 0.65% more likely to sentence a defendant above
range compared to the average judge in the courthouse during Koon. While interjudge variation did not change significantly from Koon to the PROTECT Act period,
inter-judge disparity is significantly higher after Booker and Kimbrough/Gall, with
a harsher judge 1.7% more likely to sentence a defendant above range after Kimbrough/Gall, a statistically significant increase from Koon. Inter-judge disparities
in above range departures more than doubled from the beginning to the end of the
time period.
Of course, mandatory minimums may explain a sizable fraction of defendants
that are sentenced above range if the mandatory minimum trumps the maximum
Guidelines recommended sentence. When cases with mandatory minimums are
excluded, patterns in inter-judge disparities are similar. During Koon, inter-judge
disparities in above range departures were minimal, with a one standard deviation
“harsher” judge being only 0.72% more likely to sentence above range. However,
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inter-judge disparities doubled by the end of the time period, to 1.5% after Kimbrough/Gall, a statistically significant increase from Koon. These results suggest
that increases in above range inter-judge disparities are not the mere byproduct of
mandatory minimums.
TABLE 5. I NTER - JUDGE VARIATION IN A BOVE R ANGE D EPARTURES
A LL S ENTENCES
Period
σ
Lower bound Upper bound
No. Obs.
Koon
.0065
.0047
.0089
66150
PROTECT Act
.0114
.0078
.0167
22469
Booker
.0123
.0091
.0165
35132
Kimbrough/Gall .0170
.0125
.0230
22431
E XCLUDING M ANDATORY M INIMUMS
Period
σ
Lower bound Upper bound
Koon
.0072
.0053
.0100
PROTECT Act
.0121
.0083
.0177
Booker
.0129
.0091
.0184
Kimbrough/Gall .0154
.0102
.0234

No. Obs.
44403
15400
22056
13571

Notes: Data is from the random sample from 2000-2009. All regressions contain demographic controls and
controls for offense type, offense level, and criminal history. Regressions also contain sentencing year fixed
effects, sentencing month fixed effects, and district courthouse fixed effects.

D.

Sentencing Practices by Judge Demographics

The previous section finds that inter-judge disparities in sentence length, below
range departures, and above range departures have increased significantly following
Booker, in particular after Kimbrough/Gall. In this section, I analyze whether increases in inter-judge disparities are idiosyncratic, resulting from all judges changing their behavior in similar ways, or if judges are systematically differing from
their colleagues based on observable traits.169 Recall that due to the random assignment of cases to judges within a district courthouse, any difference in judge
sentencing practices can be solely attributable to a judge effect.
Consistent with previous research,170 I find significant and systematic differences in the sentencing practices of both Democratic judicial appointees compared
to their Republican appointed peers, and female judges compared to male judges.
These differences magnified in the aftermath of Booker and Kimbrough/Gall, suggesting that they are some of the sources of the growing inter-judge disparities
identified earlier. The coefficients presented in Table 6 represent the sentencing
tendency of a particular type of judge compared to his or her colleagues within the
same district courthouse, for an observably identical defendant and case, sentenced
in the same month-year.171
169

See Appendix C for the empirical methodology used.
See supra notes 30-33.
171
All results discussed are statistically significant at the 1-10% level as denoted in Table 6. A
170
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TABLE 6. S ENTENCING P RACTICES BY J UDGE C HARACTERISTICS
A LL S ENTENCES
(1)
(2)
(3)
Sentence Below Range Above Range
Non-Govt
Post Booker Judge
2.503*
0.0489**
0.0106**
(1.446)
(0.0241)
(0.00518)
Booker
-2.153
0.0748***
0.00517
(2.160)
(0.0206)
(0.0102)
Democratic
-1.812***
0.0268***
-0.00148
(0.550)
(0.00704)
(0.00168)
Democratic*Booker
-0.484
0.0172*
-0.00235
(0.711)
(0.0100)
(0.00292)
Female
1.006**
-0.0215
0.000180
(0.478)
(0.0137)
(0.00164)
Female*Booker
-1.396*
0.00636
-0.00297
(0.765)
(0.0137)
(0.00243)
Black
-0.865
0.0141
-0.00476**
(0.688)
(0.0178)
(0.00229)
Black*Booker
-0.608
-0.0148
0.00524
(0.968)
(0.0390)
(0.00399)
Tenure
-0.140***
-0.000157
0.000207
(0.0505)
(0.00125)
(0.000200)
Tenure*Booker
-0.0114
0.00316*
3.16e-05
(0.0714)
(0.00186)
(0.000333)
Pre Guidelines
0.460
-0.00384
-0.00272
(0.648)
(0.00939)
(0.00276)
Pre Guidelines*Booker
0.251
0.0138
0.00200
(1.050)
(0.0208)
(0.00543)
Observations
145,975
145,975
145,975
R-squared
0.805
0.157
0.041
Notes: Data is from the random sample from 2000-2009. All regressions contain controls for offense
type, and dummies for each offense level and criminal history combination. Regressions also contain
district courthouse fixed effects, sentencing year and sentencing month fixed effects, and standard
errors are clustered at the district courthouse level. *** = significant at 1 percent level, ** = significant
at 5 percent level, * = significant at 10 percent level.

finding that a coefficient is statistically significant at the 1% level suggests very strong evidence for
the result, such that with 99% certainty, the real value of the coefficient is different from zero - the
null hypothesis.
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Column 1 presents results for sentence length in months. Post Booker judicial
appointees sentence observably similar defendants to 2.5 months longer in prison
compared to their pre-Booker appointed peers, significant at the 10% level. In general, Democratic judicial appointees issue significantly shorter sentences compared
to their Republican peers. Female judges significantly altered their practices from
their male counterparts within the same courthouse. Prior to Booker, female judges
sentenced observably similar defendants to an additional month in prison compared to their male colleagues. However, after Booker, female judges sentenced
observably similar defendants to approximately 1.4 months less than their male
colleagues. Finally, judges with greater experience under the mandatory Guidelines regime issue slightly shorter sentences than judges with less experience.
Columns 2 presents results for the rate of below range departures not sponsored
by the government. Inter-judge disparities in rates of below range departures appear to be somewhat attributable to differences by judge political affiliation. On average, Democratic judicial appointees are 2.7% more likely to depart downwards.
Following Booker, Democratic judicial appointees are even more likely to depart
downwards from the Guidelines recommended range, compared to their Republican appointed colleagues. For a similar defendant and crime, Democratic judges
were an additional 1.7% more likely to depart downwards. Also striking are the
inter-judge differences between judges appointed pre-Booker and judges appointed
post Booker. Post Booker judicial appointees are 4.9% more likely to sentence
below range compared to their pre-Booker appointed colleagues.
Finally, column 3 presents results for above range departures. Black judges are
in general slightly less likely to sentence above range compared to white judges.
Again, inter-judge differences persist between judges appointed pre-Booker and
judges appointed post Booker. In general, post Booker judicial appointees are 1.1%
more likely to sentence above range than their pre-Booker appointed peers.
Overall, these results suggest that sentencing differences associated with judge
gender and political affiliation are magnified after Booker and Kimbrough/Gall.
Such differences are likely sources of growing inter-judge disparities. Given these
large changes in inter-judge disparities following Booker, judges do not appear to
be completely “anchored” to the Guidelines.172
However, the finding that post Booker judicial appointees are more likely to depart from the Guidelines than pre-Booker appointees is consistent with a story in
which judges with no prior experience sentencing under the Guidelines regime are
less anchored to the regime.173 The “anchor” of the Guidelines sentence may be
more prominent to pre-Booker appointees because these judges are more acculturated and experienced with constraining their sentences to the dictates of the Guidelines. In contrast, the “anchor” is less prominent for post Booker appointees. These
potential anchoring differences between pre and post Booker appointees suggests
172

Of course, a degree of anchoring is likely occurring, which indicates that these results are only
lower bound estimates on increases in inter-judge disparities in a system in which sentencing does
not begin with the Guidelines calculation.
173
In robustness checks, I find that the behavior of post Booker appointees in my data is not due to
the fact that they are George W. Bush appointees based on comparisons with pre-Booker George W.
Bush appointees. Rather, sentencing behavior seems to be associated with lack of experience under
the binding Guidelines. Results are available upon request.
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that defense lawyer James Felman’s predictions may be true - that disparities may
“increase as the years go by and the bench is filled with individuals who have no
history with binding guidelines.”174 Yet, inter-judge disparities due to the entrance
of new judges to the federal bench might only reflect a short-term surge in disparity.
Eventually, all sitting judges will have no history with the binding Guidelines and
inter-judge disparities attributable to different levels of “anchoring” may fall.
E.

Regional Disparity: Inter-District Variation

Commentators have suggested that different political climates across districts and
circuits can affect sentencing practices,175 yielding empirical findings that jurisdictional effects are prominent in federal sentencing.176 The 2012 Commission report
finds that rates of non-government sponsored below range sentences increasingly
depend upon the district court in which the defendant is sentenced and the influence of the Guidelines on sentence length varies significantly by circuit court.177
However, some researchers have found that between-district variation in the effects
of extralegal factors on sentencing have not increased following Booker.178
Recall that the identification of the impact of Booker on inter-judge disparity
within a district courthouse relies on the random assignment of cases to judges.
Such random assignment does not exist between districts, such that differences in
district sentencing practices are most likely also due to differing caseloads. For instance, the Commission has noted that simple comparisons of regional variations
might be attributable to different types of crimes within the general offense cate174

See Felman, supra note 36, at 98-99.
See, e.g, Nora Demlietner, The Nonuniform Developments of Guideline Law in the Courts, 6
F ED . S ENT. R EP. 239, 239-40 (1994) (describing district and circuit specific “personas” in sentencing case law); Jeffrey T. Ulmer & John Kramer, Court Communities Under Sentencing Guidelines:
Dilemmas of Formal Rationality and Sentencing Disparity. 34 C RIMINOLOGY 383, 402-403 (1996)
(Based on an analysis of three county courts in Pennsylvania, the authors argue that local courts
operate under formal sentencing standards articulated by a guidelines regime and substantive, extralegal factors relevant to local courts, such as “perceptions of the defendant’s characteristics, local
concerns, and court actors’ organizational and individual interests.”); J EFFREY T. U LMER, S OCIAL
W ORLDS OF S ENTENCING : C OURT C OMMUNITIES U NDER S ENTENCING G UIDELINES 168-71
(1977).
176
See Celesta Albonetti, Sentencing Under the Federal Sentencing Guidelines: Effects of Defendant Characteristics, Guilty Pleas, and Departures on Sentence Outcomes for Drug Offenses,
1991-1992, 31 L AW & S OC ’ Y R EV. 789, 815-16 (1997) (finding significant circuit-specific sentencing practices for black and white defendants); Ronald Everett & Roger Wojtkiewicz, Difference,
Disparity, and Race/Ethnic Bias in Federal Sentencing, 18 J. Q UANTITATIVE C RIM . 189, 197-200
(2002) (finding harsher sentencing in the southern circuits compared to other circuits); Paula Kautt,
Location, Location, Location: Interdistrict and Inter circuit Variation in Sentencing Outcomes for
Federal Drug-Trafficking Offenses, 19 J USTICE Q UARTERLY 633, 659 (2002) (“[D]espite the federal system’s congressionally mandated return to determinate sentencing, extra-legal factors (specifically jurisdictional effects) continue to influence the federal sentencing system and its outcomes
directly and indirectly.”).
177
U.S. S ENTENCING C OMMISSION, R EPORT ON THE C ONTINUING I MPACT OF U NITED
S TATES V. B OOKER ON F EDERAL S ENTENCING at 87-91 (2012).
178
See Jeffery T. Ulmer et al., The “Liberation” of Federal Judges’ Discretion In the Wake of
the Booker/Fanfan Decision: Is there Increased Disparity and Divergence Between Courts?, 28
J USTICE Q UARTERLY 799, 829-30 (2011).
175
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gories, such that frauds sentenced in the Southern District of New York are substantially different from frauds sentenced in the District of North Dakota.179
While I cannot control for unobservable differences across districts, the empirical methodology in this Article does control comprehensively for observable
offender and case characteristics.180 For the inter-district results, I utilize the full
USSC data from 2000-2009 as random assignment is no longer a prerequisite.181 In
the context of inter-district disparities, analysis of variation now yields an estimate
of the standard deviation of district effects on sentence length, σ, after controlling
for case and defendant characteristics. Thus, a finding of σ = 5 now suggests that
a defendant sentenced in a one standard deviation “harsher” district is sentenced to
five more months in prison, than if he were sentenced in an average district court.
Figure 8 presents raw distributions of sentence lengths by circuit court, excluding life sentences.182 While uncontrolled differences cannot be treated as regional
effects because districts have very different case compositions, the raw data reveals substantial differences in sentence length, both in the distribution between the
25th percentile and 75th percentile, and presence of outliers. For instance, prior
to Booker, defendants sentenced in the Third Circuit received an average sentence
of 56 months, compared to an average sentence of 78 months for defendants sentenced in the neighboring Fourth Circuit. After Booker, the average Third Circuit
defendant received 62 months in prison, while the average Fourth Circuit defendant
received 84 months in prison.

179

U.S. S ENTENCING C OMMISSION, F IFTEEN Y EARS OF G UIDELINES S ENTENCING : A N
A SSESSMENT OF H OW W ELL THE F EDERAL C RIMINAL J USTICE S YSTEM IS ACHIEVING THE
G OALS OF S ENTENCING R EFORM at 99-100 (Nov. 2004) (“Similarly, variations in the rates of a
particular type of departure among different districts must be evaluated within a larger context of
each district’s distinctive adaptation to the guidelines system. Inferring unwarranted disparity from
uncontrolled comparisons of average sentences or rates of departure may be erroneous.”).
180
Nevertheless, the results on inter-district variation should be interpreted with some caution to
the extent that there are unobserved differences across district courts that cannot be captured.
181
Random assignment of cases is no longer a prerequisite for statistical analysis because the unit
of comparison is now district courts, rather than judges within courts.
182
Life sentences are top coded as 470 months in the dataset.
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Notes: Data is from the USSC from 2000-2009.

Table 7 shows that after controlling for case and defendant characteristics, there
is substantial variation in the sentence that a defendant would receive depending
on the district court in which he is sentenced. During the Koon period, a defendant sentenced in a one standard deviation “harsher” district court received a 7.4
month longer prison sentence. This inter-district disparity increased to 7.8 months
during the PROTECT Act, and then to 9.5 months immediately following Booker,
reaching a 10.6 month difference after Kimbrough/Gall. By late 2007, inter-district
disparities were significantly larger than existed under Koon.
Analyzing the subset of cases in which a mandatory minimum was not charged
more than halves the magnitude of σ, the measure of inter-district variation. The
lower panel of Table 7 indicates that a one standard deviation “harsher” district court
sentenced a defendant to 3.5 months longer than the average district court under
Koon, 4.1 months longer after the PROTECT Act, 4.5 months longer after Booker,
and 4.6 months longer after Kimbrough/Gall. Again, the finding that inter-district
variation is more than halved when a statutory minimum is not charged indicates
that the application of mandatory minimums is potentially a large contributor to
inter-district disparities, particularly in light of the fact that mandatory minimums
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represent only approximately one-third of the cases.
TABLE 7. I NTER -D ISTRICT VARIATION IN S ENTENCE L ENGTHS
A LL S ENTENCES
Period
σ
Lower bound Upper bound No. Obs.
Koon
7.358
6.339
8.542
194510
PROTECT Act
7.829
6.716
9.126
99971
Booker
9.525
8.218
11.039
171097
Kimbrough/Gall 10.632
9.124
12.388
119957
E XCLUDING M ANDATORY M INIMUMS
Period
σ
Lower bound Upper bound
Koon
3.545
3.028
4.149
PROTECT Act
4.119
3.516
4.825
Booker
4.556
3.918
5.297
Kimbrough/Gall 4.611
3.956
5.375

No. Obs.
136932
72276
117585
83917

Notes: Data is from the USSC from 2000-2009. All regressions contain demographic controls and
controls for offense type, offense level, and criminal history. Regressions also contain sentencing year
fixed effects, sentencing month fixed effects.

Table 8 reveals that district courts also significantly differ in their rates of below
range departures. A defendant sentenced in a one standard deviation more “lenient”
district is 12.1% more likely to be sentenced below the Guidelines range, compared
to the average district court, during Koon. This measure of inter-district variation
for below range departures remains relatively constant throughout the entire sample,
both including and excluding mandatory minimums. Booker and Kimbrough/Gall
do not appear to have dramatically increased inter-district disparity with regards to
downward departures.
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TABLE 8. I NTER -D ISTRICT VARIATION IN B ELOW R ANGE D EPARTURES
A LL S ENTENCES
Period
σ
Lower bound Upper bound
No. Obs.
Koon
.1208
.1041
.1402
157103
PROTECT Act
.1198
.1031
.1392
83453
Booker
.1341
.1156
.1555
147774
Kimbrough/Gall .1289
.1109
.1497
105535
E XCLUDING M ANDATORY M INIMUMS
Period
σ
Lower bound Upper bound
Koon
.1125
.0969
.1308
PROTECT Act
.1113
.0956
.1296
Booker
.1251
.1078
.1453
Kimbrough/Gall .1256
.1073
.1463

No. Obs.
103720
58066
97568
71994

Notes: Data is from the USSC from 2000-2009. All regressions contain demographic controls and controls for offense type,
offense level, and criminal history. Regressions also contain sentencing year fixed effects, sentencing month fixed effects.

F.

Prosecutorial Contributions to Disparities

Prosecutors likely contribute to observed inter-judge disparities through their charging decisions. One area of great prosecutorial discretion is the decision to charge
an offense that carries a mandatory minimum. As Justice Breyer has noted, mandatory minimum statutes “transfer sentencing power to prosecutors, who can determine sentences through the charges they decide to bring.”183 Strategic charging of
mandatory minimums is likely more prominent after Booker as some prosecutors
charge mandatory minimums in order to curb judges’ discretion.184
In a 2011 Congressional report on mandatory minimum penalties, the Sentencing Commission found significant variation in the extent which prosecutors applied enhancements for mandatory minimum penalties under drug trafficking offenses.185 The report documented over 75% of eligible defendants receiving the
statutory mandatory minimum penalty in some districts, but none of eligible defendants in other districts receiving the enhancement.186 Furthermore, recent work by
researchers shows evidence of significant racial disparities in prosecutorial charging.187
183

Harris v. United States, 536 U.S. 545, 571 (2002) (Breyer, J., concurring).
See Testimony of Patrick J. Fitzgerald, U.S. Attorney, Northern District of Illinois, to the United
States Sentencing Commission, at 252 (Sept. 2009) (“[A] prosecutor is far less willing to forego
charging a mandatory minimum sentence when prior experience shows that the defendant will ultimately be sentenced to a mere fraction of what the guidelines range is.”).
185
U.S. S ENTENCING C OMMISSION, R EPORT TO C ONGRESS : M ANDATORY M INIMUM
P ENALTIES IN THE F EDERAL C RIMINAL J USTICE S YSTEM, supra note 88, at 252-261.
186
See id. at 111-113, 255 (explaining that prosecutors reported wide variations in the district
practices on seeking statutory minimum penalties).
187
See M. Marit Rehavi & Sonja B. Starr, Racial Disparity in Federal Criminal Charging and Its
Sentencing Consequences, University of Michigan Law & Economics Working Paper, 1-5 (2012).
Using data on 58,000 federal criminal cases from 2007-2009, the authors find significant racial
disparities in severity of initial charges. Id. at 2-3. In particular, they find that black offenders are on
184
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Prosecutors are also in charge of the decision to reduce sentences below the
mandatory minimum if the defendant offers “substantial assistance” during another
investigation or prosecution.188 If the government files a motion for substantial
assistance for a case involving a mandatory minimum sentence, the court has the
power to impose a sentence as low as probation.189 Scholars have commented that
the substantial assistance departure provision affords prosecutors immense discretion over both plea bargaining and sentencing outcomes under the Guidelines.190
I find that the application of mandatory minimums may be a large contributor
to inter-judge disparities. Given the random assignment of cases to judges within
a district courthouse, equal application of mandatory minimums among eligible
cases prior to assignment would result in no significant judge differences in the
rate of mandatory minimums applied. However, mandatory minimums can also be
charged after assignment through the use of superseding indictments, giving prosecutors even greater control in their charging decisions. The results in Table 9 reveal
small, but significant differences in the percentage of cases with applicable mandatory minimums across judges. A judge one standard deviation out in the distribution
was 2.2% more likely to see a case with a mandatory minimum during Koon, but
3.2% more likely after Kimbrough/Gall to see such a case. The increase in the differential rates of mandatory minimums after Kimbrough/Gall coincides with substantial increases in inter-judge disparities in below range departures. These results
are consistent with a story in which prosecutors are attempting to rein in judicially
induced downward departures through the strategic application of mandatory minimums. While strategic targeting of mandatory minimums toward more lenient
judges may actually increase inter-judge consistency, mandatory minimums far exceed even the maximum of the Guidelines range roughly 40% of the time when
applied. Thus, given the crudeness and severity of mandatory minimums, strategic
charging could plausibly enlarge differences in sentencing outcomes across judges.
Of course, the contribution of disparate treatment of mandatory minimums to
disparities is only the tip of the iceberg. Unobserved in the empirical data, but
just as disconcerting, are the strategic charging decisions made by prosecutors even
if a mandatory minimum is not applicable. For instance, prosecutors may vary
average more than two times as likely to be subjected to a mandatory minimum sentence compared
to similar white offenders, and that a major part of the racial gap in sentence length can be attributed
to the prosecutorial bias in initial charge. Id. at 3, 5.
188
18 U.S.C. §3553(e); Guidelines Manual, §5K1.1. A judge has some leeway in reducing sentence length for certain drug trafficking offenses under the “safety valve” provision, which allows
a judge to reduce the punishment for low level, first time offenders. See 18 U.S.C. §3553(f). The
Commission also notes that in recent years, white defendants in drug cases are more frequently
granted the safety valve exception than other defendants. U.S. S ENTENCING C OMMISSION, supra
note 88, at 188 .
189
According to the Sentencing Commission, substantial assistance motions reduce the average
defendant’s sentence length by 50%.
190
See Nagel & Schulhofer, supra note 38, at 550 (“The use of the section 5K1.1 substantialassistance motion varies from jurisdiction to jurisdiction....There is no limit on the amount of reduction once the motion is submitted. The section 5K1.1 motion is also used to avoid guideline
ranges or mandatory minimum sentences for sympathetic defendants – even when there has been
no genuine substantial assistance.”); M ICHAEL H. T ONRY, S ENTENCING M ATTERS 81-82, 90-91
(describing how to amend substantial assistance provisions to give judges more discretion) (1996).
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whether to seek sentencing enhancements by proving relevant aggravating facts
by a preponderance of the evidence. Accordingly, the finding that prosecutorial
charging of mandatory minimums contributes to measures of inter-judge disparities
is likely an underestimate of the real magnitude of the phenomenon.
TABLE 9. I NTER - JUDGE VARIATION IN M ANDATORY M INIMUMS
A LL S ENTENCES
Period
σ
Lower bound Upper bound No. Obs.
Koon
.0222
.0179
.0275
66132
PROTECT Act
.0164
.0089
.0240
22469
Booker
.0292
.0231
.0368
35140
Kimbrough/Gall .0323
.0242
.0431
22426
Notes: Data is from the random sample from 2000-2009. All regressions contain demographic controls
and controls for offense type, offense level, and criminal history. Regressions also contain sentencing
year fixed effects, sentencing month fixed effects, and district courthouse fixed effects.

TABLE 10. I NTER - JUDGE VARIATION IN S UBSTANTIAL A SSISTANCE
A LL S ENTENCES
Period
σ
Lower bound Upper bound
No. Obs.
Koon
.0372
.0307
.0450
49812
PROTECT Act
.0314
.0248
.0399
41298
Booker
.0286
.0233
.0351
73592
Kimbrough/Gall .0362
.0301
.0434
52408
Notes: Data is from the random sample from 2000-2009. All regressions contain demographic controls
and controls for offense type, offense level, and criminal history. Regressions also contain sentencing
year fixed effects, sentencing month fixed effects, and district courthouse fixed effects.

Tables A2 and Table A3 in Appendix A confirm that a large portion of interdistrict differences in the sentencing of observably similar defendants arises from
district variation in both the charging of mandatory minimums and the application
of a substantial assistance motion. Table A2 reveals that a defendant sentenced
in a one standard deviation “harsher” district is approximately 6% more likely to
be charged with a mandatory minimum. Table A3 also presents evidence of large
inter-district differences in the rates of substantial assistance motions, with a defendant being approximately 9% more likely to be granted this form of downward
departure in more “lenient” districts. As previously noted, the application of a substantial assistance motion is often applied “to avoid guideline ranges or mandatory
minimum sentences for sympathetic defendants - even when there has been no genuine substantial assistance.”191 However, inter-district differences in average rates
of mandatory minimums and rates of substantial assistance motions do not appear
to have increased significantly following Booker and Kimbrough/Gall.

191

Nagel & Schulhofer, supra note 38, at 550.
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P OLICY R ECOMMENDATIONS

Numerous proposals for reforming sentencing arose in the aftermath of Booker, due
to dissatisfaction with the state of federal sentencing. Indeed, the equity stakes are
high as similar offenders receive increasingly disparate sentences based on the mere
happenstance of the sentencing judge to whom they are assigned. While several
of the major proposals for reform contemplate a reduction in judicial discretion,
the proposals largely ignore the role of other institutional actors - in particular,
prosecutors - who play a central and powerful role in sentencing decisions and
disparities.
Recognizing the degree of prosecutorial power, both scholars and district court
judges have expressed the view that the current advisory Guidelines best achieves
the goals of sentencing because it reflects the right balance between various actors
in federal sentencing.192 Of district judges surveyed in 2010, over 75% prefer the
current advisory Guidelines system to other alternatives.193 14% of judges favored
“[a] system of mandatory [G]uidelines that comply with the Sixth Amendment and
have broader sentencing ranges than currently exist, coupled with fewer statutory
mandatory minimums.”194 Only 3% of judges preferred a return to the pre-Booker
Guidelines system, suggesting that the overwhelming majority of judges would be
opposed to reforms that solely curb judicial discretion.
This section describes three of the major proposals for reform of federal sentencing after Booker: (A) “Topless” Guidelines that control only sentence minimums, but not maximums, (B) “Blakely-ized” Guidelines that require aggravating
facts triggering longer maximums to be proven by a jury beyond reasonable doubt,
and (C) a return to a presumptive Guidelines regime that more closely - though constitutionally - resembles the pre-Booker regime. I describe each proposal in turn,
and then apply the empirical findings in this paper to assess the desirability of the
various proposals, in light of the goal of reducing inter-judge disparities.
A.

“Topless” Guidelines

Within a few months after Booker, the Department of Justice recommended a new
“topless” Guidelines system, in which the “top” of existing Guidelines ranges would
essentially be removed.195 Echoing the regime first proposed by Professor Frank
Bowman, this construction would still allow judicial fact-finding of facts that raised
the minimum applicable sentence, and thus remain constitutional under the principles espoused in Blakely.196 Recall that Blakely applied the Sixth Amendment
192

See Michael Tonry, The U.S. Sentencing Commission’s Best Response to Booker is to Do Nothing, 24 F ED . S ENT. R EP. 387, 387-88 (2012); Sara Sun Beale, Is Now the Time for Major Sentencing Reform?, 24 F ED . S ENT. R EP. 382, 384-85 (2012).
193
See U.S. S ENTENCING C OMMISSION, supra note 27, at 23 (Question 19, Table 19).
194
Id.
195
See Federal Guidelines Sentencing Speech, supra note 23, at 326 (favoring “the construction
of a minimum guideline system”).
196
See Memorandum from Frank Bowman to U.S. Sentencing Comm’n (June 27, 2004), 16 F ED .
S ENTENCING R EP. 364, 367 (2004).
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to challenge judicial fact-finding which raised a defendant’s maximum sentence.197
As a result, the recommended “topless” Guidelines system - which allows for judicial fact-finding of precisely these aggravating factors - appears to comport with
both Blakely and Harris v. United States, which held that facts triggering a mandatory minimum sentence could be found by a judge.198 However, commentators
were skeptical of whether the Court’s holding in Harris would survive Booker.199
Indeed, since Booker, the constitutional viability of a “topless” Guidelines system
has now been firmly rejected by the Supreme Court’s recent holding in Alleyne v.
United States, in which the Court squarely overruled Harris.200
Moreover, even if constitutionally permissible under the Sixth Amendment, the
“topless” regime takes the prior mandatory Guidelines as the baseline, which some
argue “would constitute a step backwards in the development and evolution of the
federal sentencing system by exacerbating some of the worst features of the preBooker federal sentencing.”201 By binding judges to the applicable minimum sentence, the “topless” proposal would likely re-introduce the pre-Booker concerns
associated with prosecutorial power in charging and plea bargaining.202
Indeed, the evidence from Part III provides empirical support for the proposition
that a “topless" Guidelines proposal would potentially aggravate disparities that are
attributable to prosecutorial charging decisions. Table 1 and Table 7, which present
evidence of inter-judge disparities and inter-district disparities, are reduced by almost a factor of two when mandatory minimums are excluded from analyses. These
results suggest that the decision to charge a mandatory minimum contributes substantially to inter-judge differences, such that these decisions are not made equally
across all eligible cases. The results also indicate that mandatory minimum practices differ largely across U.S. district courts. Accordingly, any proposal that binds
judges to the applicable minimum sentence would ascribe greater power to prosecutors, likely resulting in greater disparities. Furthermore, results in Table 5 suggest
that there have been substantial increases in inter-judge disparities in above range
departures even when a mandatory minimum is not charged. As a result, to the
extent that a “topless” regime seeks to limit judicial discretion, it does so in an
asymmetrical manner.

197

Blakely, 542 U.S. 296.
536 U.S. 545, 567-69 (2002).
199
See, e.g., Erwin Chemerinsky, Making Sense of Apprendi and its Progeny, 37 M C G EORGE L.
R EV. 531, 541 (2006); Frank O. Bowman III, Mr. Madison Meets a Time Machine: The Political
Science of Federal Sentencing Reform, 58 S TAN . L. R EV. 235, 261 (2005).
200
Alleyne v. United States, 133 S. Ct. 420, slip op. at 15 (2012) (“Because there is no basis in
principle or logic to distinguish facts that raise the maximum from those that increase the minimum,
Harris was inconsistent with Apprendi. It is, accordingly, overruled.”).
201
See Berman, Tweaking Booker, supra note 116, at 363. Berman also discusses potential constitutional challenges to a “topless” Guidelines system. Id. at 359-62.
202
Id. at 364 (“Consequently, the most problematic facets and the most disconcerting consequences in terms of prosecutorial power, disparity, and evasion experienced in the pre-Booker federal sentencing system would likely be aggravated by the enactment of any sort of topless guideline
Booker fix.”).
198
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“Blakely-ized” Guidelines

In Booker, Justice Breyer’s ultimate remedy for the Sixth Amendment issues facing the Federal Sentencing Guidelines was to declare the Guidelines “effectively
advisory.”203 But one could have imagined another approach: to “Blakely-ize" the
Guidelines. Indeed, the Justices dissenting from the Breyer remedial opinion in
Booker suggested leaving the mandatory Guidelines intact, but requiring that aggravating facts triggering longer maximums be proven by a jury beyond reasonable
doubt, or admitted by the defendant.204
However, introducing jury fact-finding into a mandatory Guidelines system is
likely particularly complex. Justice Breyer in his Booker remedial opinion mused
over how jury fact-finding might work, asking “[w]ould the indictment have to
allege, in addition to the elements of robbery, whether the defendant possessed a
firearm, whether he brandished or discharged it, whether he threatened death...?”205
Other scholars have echoed the concern that Blakely-izing the current version of
the Guidelines would be procedurally unworkable and overwhelm juries required
to make findings of fact.206
Addressing some of Justice Breyer’s concerns, a 2005 American Bar Association (ABA) Report suggested a version of the Blakely-ized system espoused by
Justice Stevens in his Booker dissent, accompanied with “simplifying the Guidelines by reducing both the number of offense levels and the number of adjustments
and presenting the remaining, more essential, culpability factors to the jury.”207
The ABA contemplates that these critical culpability factors would be charged in
the indictment and presented to the jury, resulting in a sentencing range.208 The
Guidelines maximum associated with the jury-determined range would be binding
on judges such that upward departures without jury fact-finding would be impermissible.209
This Article cannot comment on the relative abilities of judges and juries to determine the applicability of aggravating and mitigating factors. Even supposing that
juries are capable of fact determinations of complex aggravating and mitigating factors under the “Blakely-ized” Guidelines,210 once a jury has made factual determinations as to conduct based on what a prosecutor chose to charge, a judge is bound
203

Booker, 543 U.S. at 245.
Booker, 543 U.S. at 284-85 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (“Rather than engage in a wholesale rewriting of the SRA, I would simply allow the Government to continue doing what it has done since this
Court handed down Blakely–prove any fact that is required to increase a defendant’s sentence under
the Guidelines to a jury beyond a reasonable doubt.” ).
205
Id. at 254.
206
See Bowman, Beyond Band-Aids, supra note 113, at 191 (“[T]he consensus view is that the
Guidelines as now written are simply too complex and confusing to operate through juries”).
207
ABA Criminal Justice Section, Report and Recommendation on Booker (Jan. 2005), reprinted
in 17 F ED . S ENT. R EP. 335, 339 (2005).
208
Id.
209
Id.
210
Justice Breyer has raised concerns over how a judge would expect a jury to determine Guidelines factors such as “relevant conduct,” “loss” in a securities fraud case, or a defendant’s behavior
at trial, something a prosecutor cannot even observe at the time of the indictment. Booker, 543 U.S.
at 254-55.
204
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by these determinations. For instance, if a jury did not make a factual determination with respect to a potential aggravating factor, a judge would not be allowed to
consider this fact, even if it were applicable. As Justice Breyer noted, incorporating
the jury trial requirement into federal sentencing would “weaken the tie between
a sentence and an offender’s real conduct” because such a system would “effectively deprive the judge of the ability to use post-verdict-acquired real-conduct information.”211 Thus, to the extent that the mandatory Guidelines regime enhanced
prosecutorial discretion and disparity, jury fact-finding in the face of extensive plea
bargaining “would move the system backwards in respect to both tried and pleabargained cases” by effectively “prohibit[ing] the judge from basing a sentence
upon any conduct other than the conduct the prosecutor chose to charge.”212
This Article provides evidence suggesting that a large component of disparities stem from prosecutorial charging decisions, and that prosecutors vary in their
charging across similar defendants convicted of similar conduct. A requirement of
jury fact-finding in a mandatory Guidelines regime may exacerbate these disparities. The goal of sentencing uniformity may be even more compromised in a system
controlled by prosecutorial discretion because “[a]s long as different prosecutors react differently, a system with a patched-on jury factfinding requirement would mean
different sentences for otherwise similar conduct, whether in the context of trials or
that of plea bargaining.”213
C.

Judge Sessions’ Proposal

Most recently, former Sentencing Commission Chair Judge William K. Sessions
III has recommended adoption of a simplified presumptive Guidelines system.214
Judge Sessions argues in favor of a new sentencing regime that balances two goals:
(1) the need to reduce unwarranted sentencing disparities curbing the ability of
judges to use subjective notions of justice to mete out punishment, and (2) giving
judges discretion to tailor sentencing to the unique circumstances of offenders and
offenses.215 Judge Sessions recommends a reduction in the number of possible
sentencing ranges, but broader ranges to afford judges greater discretion.216 In order
to comply with the constitutional requirements identified in Blakely, Judge Sessions
suggests that any facts that would increase the base offense level would have to be
proven by a jury beyond a reasonable doubt, unless admitted to by the defendant,
potentially through a bifurcated jury trial.217
211

Id. at 257.
Id. at 256 (“[P]lea bargaining would likely lead to sentences that gave greater weight, not to
real conduct, but rather to the skill of counsel, the policies of the prosecutor, the caseload, and other
factors that vary from place to place, defendant to defendant, and crime to crime...plea bargaining
of this kind would necessary move federal sentencing in the direction of diminished, not increased,
uniformity in sentencing”). For a more thorough discussion of the potential problems with this
particular recommendation, see Berman, Tweaking Booker, supra note 116, at 365-71.
213
Booker, 543 U.S. at 257.
214
Sessions, supra note 24, at 340.
215
Id. at 339.
216
Id. at 340-45 (describing recommended changes to the current Guidelines sentencing chart).
217
Id. at 346.
212
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Judge Sessions also proposes simplifying the Guidelines by reducing the number of aggravating or mitigating factors that increase or decrease the base offense
level under Chapter Two and Chapter Three of the Guidelines Manual, which many
have argued are overly complex.218 In deciding which aggravating factors to keep
within the Guidelines, Sessions argues in favor of the strategy suggested by Justice
Breyer - empirically reviewing which enhancements in Chapter Two are commonly
used.219
Finally, Judge Sessions suggests a new form of appellate scrutiny because “[t]he
threat of reversal [on appeal] is a key component of [effective] guidelines.”220 Within
range sentences would be “essentially unreviewable on appeal ... [unless] a district
court refused to consider all relevant factors or instead considered a prohibited factor, such as a defendant’s race or gender.”221 In contrast, Judge Sessions proposes
“relatively strict scrutiny by the appellate court” for downward departures.222
Critics of the Sessions proposal argue that the proposal would eliminate “judicial feedback to the Commission and constructive evolution of the [G]uidelines
would virtually cease” as judges would have limited authority in setting the applicable sentence range.223 Undoubtedly, Booker has given judges the freedom to
consider the particular circumstances of the offense and traits of the defendant.224
To the extent that growing inter-judge disparities are reflective of these considerations, disparities are warranted and judicial discretion is desirable. On the other
hand, some have suggested that the shift to advisory Guidelines has been accompanied by increases in unwarranted disparities.225
The empirical findings in Part III of this Article reveal that inter-judge disparities
have doubled from the period of mandatory Guidelines sentencing to post Booker
sentencing, with a defendant potentially receiving a five month longer sentence due
to the mere happenstance of the judge assigned. Certainly, a return to “presumptive”
Guidelines would mechanically reduce inter-judge disparities by greatly limiting ju218

Id. at 347-48; see also Frank O. Bowman III, The Failure of the Federal Sentencing Guidelines, 105 C OLUM . L. R EV. 1315, 1341 (2005); Stephen Breyer, Federal Sentencing Guidelines
Revisited, 11 F ED . S ENTENCING R EP. 180 (1999) (“[T]he Guidelines are simply too long and too
complicated.”).
219
Sessions, supra note 24, at 349; Breyer, supra note 55, at 184 ("... I believe the Commission should review the present Guidelines, acting forcefully to diminish significantly the number
of offense characteristics attached to individual crimes. The characteristics that remain should be
justified for the most part by data that shows their use by practicing judges to change sentences ...
.").
220
Sessions, supra note 24, at 353-54.
221
Id.
222
Id. (“District courts’ choices of sentences within the applicable cells on the grid would be essentially unreviewable on appeal so long as the courts considered all of the relevant aggravating and
mitigating factors identified in the application notes and all other relevant factors in the Guidelines
Manual before imposing a particular sentence.”).
223
Baron-Evans & Stith, supra note 26, at 1716.
224
Id. at 1742.
225
Bowman, Nothing is Not Enough, 24 F ED . S ENT. R EP. 356, 356 (June 2012) (“[T]he postBooker advisory system retains most of the flaws of the system it replaced, while adding new ones,
and its sole relative advantage - that of conferring additional (and effectively unreviewable) discretion on sentencing judges - is insufficient to justify its retention as a permanent system.”); Sessions,
supra note 24, at 329-31.
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dicial discretion. However, the empirical evidence seeks to ascertain the effect of
the sentencing regime on inter-judge disparities in outcomes that are most likely
attributable to judge behavior. Differences in sentence lengths can be attributable to
both judge disparities as well as differences in charging of mandatory minimums.
The findings in this Article suggest that a return to a presumptive regime, without
any changes in mandatory minimums, would only go partway in reducing disparities, and curtail potentially desirable judicial discretion.
While this Article does not provide evidence supporting a return to “presumptive” Guidelines, it does suggest that strictness of appellate review is a potentially
important constraint on judicial discretion in sentencing. Inter-judge disparities in
below range departures were generally lowest during the PROTECT Act, which
imposed de novo review.226 Furthermore, empirical evidence suggests that Booker
alone did not contribute to recent increases in inter-judge disparities. Rather, it appears to be the impact of Booker plus reduced appellate scrutiny following Rita,
Gall and Kimbrough that are responsible for the largest increases in inter-judge disparities.
Thus, reforms to strengthen the degree of appellate review could possibly reduce inter-judge sentencing disparities. In Gall, the Court did not require appellate
courts to insist upon “extraordinary” circumstances to justify a sentence outside
the Guidelines recommended range, specifically rejecting stronger justifications for
sentences that departed more greatly from the Guidelines.227 In order to constrain
inter-judge disparities, the Commission could require district court judges to provide a heightened justification for more severe departures from the prescribed sentence, without coming too close to an “ impermissible presumption of unreasonableness for sentences outside the Guidelines range.....[which] would not be consistent with Booker.”228
The findings in the Article also suggest that mandatory minimums are likely
a large contributor to disparities, stemming from judicial disagreement over the
lengths of mandatory minimums, strategic charging of mandatory minimums by
prosecutors, or both. Even absent a wholesale elimination of mandatory minimums,
uniform charging policies could reduce disparities. And in fact recent changes in
policy may be moving in this direction. In August 2013, Attorney General Eric
Holder announced a new DOJ policy directing prosecutors to avoid charging lowlevel, non-violent drug offenders with offenses carrying mandatory minimum sentences.229 Following suit, the Sentencing Commission voted unanimously to continue its work on addressing concerns with mandatory minimum penalties.230 While
226

Supra tbls 3-4.
Gall, 552 U.S. at 47 (“In reviewing the reasonableness of a sentence outside the Guidelines
range, appellate courts may therefore take the degree of variance into account and consider the extent
of a deviation from the Guidelines. We reject, however, an appellate rule that requires ‘extraordinary’
circumstances to justify a sentence outside the Guidelines range. We also reject the use of a rigid
mathematical formula that uses the percentage of a departure as the standard for determining the
strength of the justifications required for a specific sentence.”).
228
Id. at 47.
229
Memorandum to United States Attorneys, Aug.
12, 2013, available at
http://www.popehat.com/wp-content/uploads/2013/08/holder-mandatory-drug-minimums-memo.pdf
230
Press Release, U.S. Sentencing Comm’n, U.S. Sentencing Commission Selects Policy
Priorities for 2013-2014 Guidelines Amendment Cycles (Aug. 15, 2013), available at
227
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the impact of these policy directives remains to be seen, reforms to reduce sentencing disparities must ultimately include changes to mandatory minimum penalties.
V

C ONCLUSION

Exploiting the random assignment of cases to judges in district courthouses representing seventy-four federal district courts, this Article finds a significant increase in
inter-judge disparities from the Koon period to after Kimbrough and Gall. A defendant sentenced by a “harsh” judge during the Koon-era was sentenced to 2.8 months
longer than if he had been sentenced by the average judge. The same defendant
would have been sentenced to almost six months longer after Kimbrough/Gall, a
doubling of inter-judge disparities. Increased inter-judge disparities persist even excluding cases in which mandatory minimums were charged, suggesting that judges
are not completely anchored to the Guidelines. These findings raise large equity
concerns, as the identity of the assigned sentencing judge contributes significantly
to the disparate treatment of similar offenders convicted of similar crimes.
Increases in between-judge differences following Booker and Kimbrough/Gall
appear to be linked to observable judicial demographics such as gender, political
affiliation of appointing president, and whether a judge has ever sentenced under the mandatory Guidelines regime. I also find modest evidence of increases
in inter-district differences following Kimbrough/Gall, with large inter-district differences in sentence length, rates of below range departures, rates of mandatory
minimums, and rates of substantial assistance motions. However, the magnitudes
of both inter-judge and inter-district disparities are drastically smaller when mandatory minimums are excluded, suggesting that prosecutorial charging decisions may
be a major contributor to sentencing disparities.
Overall, these results suggest that the shift to an advisory Guidelines regime under Booker, coupled with lowered standards of appellate scrutiny after Rita, Kimbrough, and Gall, have led to greater inter-judge disparities. Prosecutorial charging
decisions, at least in the application of mandatory minimums, appear to play a substantial role in explaining disparities. While a first step in disentangling the sources
of disparities ascribable to various actors, a primary limitation of this Article is its
inability to thoroughly analyze all the disparities that can arise in earlier stages of
the criminal justice system, such as through charging and plea bargaining. Nevertheless, the results of this Article caution against recent proposals to move back
towards a sentencing system in which judges are bound by the decisions of prosecutors. Instead, this Article suggests that it may be wise to modify standards of
appellate review, as well as revisit the desirability of mandatory minimums.

http : //www.ussc.gov/Legislativea ndP ublicA f f airs/N ewsroom/P ressR eleases/20130815P ressR elease.pdf
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A PPENDIX
A.

Testing for Random Assignment

To test for random assignment, I regress five defendant characteristics on district
courthouse by sentencing year fixed effects, sentencing month fixed effects and
judge fixed effects. The five defendant characteristics include: gender, age, a
black race indicator, number of dependents, and an indicator for education, noting whether the defendant holds less than a high school degree. Intuitively, there
should be no significant correlation between a particular judge and defendant characteristics if cases are randomly assigned.
However, in testing the random assignment of defendants across these five characteristics, I encounter the problem that defendant characteristics are not fully independent. For instance, black defendants are also likely to have completed less
than a high school degree. To address the confounding nature of these characteristics, I use seemingly unrelated regression (SUR) to test for random assignment.
SUR allows me to test random assignment simultaneously for all the five defendant
characteristics, addressing correlations.231
SUR can be formally described as the regression model:
Yijdtm = α0 + γd + δt + γd ∗ δt + λm + κj + ijdtm
where Yijdtm is a characteristic of defendant i, sentenced by judge j in district court
d in year t and month m. The specification includes district court fixed effects
(γd ), sentencing year fixed effects (δt ), sentencing month fixed effects (λm ), and
sentencing judge fixed effects( κj ) to accurately compare cases assigned to judges
in the same courthouse, and in the same year and month.
To formally test for random assignment, I test the null hypothesis of no judge
effects - κ - using an F-test. The p-value for this F-test tests whether the defendant
characteristics do not differ significantly among the cases that are assigned to district court judges in the same district courthouse, sentencing year, and sentencing
month. A large p-value would signify the acceptance of the null hypothesis, and
lead to the conclusion that random assignment was present.
Table A1 presents the randomization checks done by district courthouse, along
with associated p-values. I drop all courthouses with F-test p-values less than 0.05,
but results are robust to other cutoffs. Dropped courthouses are indicated with **.

231

Testing each characteristic individually would result in incorrect standard errors if the demographic characteristics are correlated. For a discussion of the SUR technique, see David H. Autor
& Susan N. Houseman, Do Temporary-Help Jobs Improve Labor Market Outcomes for Low-Skilled
Workers? Evidence from “Work First”, 2 AEJ: Applied Economics 96, 106-107 (2010).
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TABLE A1. R ANDOMIZATION T ESTS 2000-2009
District Courthouse
No. Obs. P-value
ME (0)
1,722
0.3623
MA (1)
4,041
0.0666
NH (2)
1,457
0.5420
PR (4)
4,216
0.0820
CT** (5)
2,811
0.0002
NY North - Syracuse (6)
1,058
0.0941
NY North - Albany (6)
1,589
0.2107
NY East - Islip (7)
908
0.0920
NY South - White Plains (8)
832
0.1595
NY West - Rochester (9)
1,058
0.1368
VT (10)
1,304
0.0739
DE (11)
855
0.5426
NJ ** (12)
5,414
0.0000
PA East** (13)
7,208
0.0000
PA Middle - Scranton (14)
1,142
0.3819
PA Middle - Williamsport (14)
435
0.0691
PA West** (15)
3,088
0.0000
MD (16)
4,453
0.2884
NC East (17)
4,570
0.4106
NC Middle - Greensboro (18)
2,629
0.3887
NC West**(19)
4,301
0.0000
SC - Columbia (20)
1,295
0.7777
SC - Florence (20)
1,358
0.0786
VA East - Alexandria (22)
2,510
0.3583
VA East - Richmond (22)
2,446
0.0589
VA East - Newport News (22)
1,125
0.0709
VA West (23)
3,913
0.4506
WV North - Martinsburg (24)
594
0.4937
WV South (25)
2,297
0.5926
AL North (26)
3,867
0.0597
AL Middle (27)
1,522
0.2279
AL South (28)
2,552
0.2568
FL North - Tallahassee (29)
733
0.1338
FL North - Panama City (29)
432
0.1353
FL Middle (30)
8,206
0.0850
FL South (31)
11,747
0.3807
GA North** (32)
5,356
0.0000
GA Middle (33)
2,506
0.1643
LA East (35)
3,058
0.1635
LA West (36)
2,542
0.1538
MS North (37)
1,071
0.4247
MS South (38)
3,318
0.0900
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TABLE A1. R ANDOMIZATION T ESTS 2000-2009 (C ONTINUED )
TX North - Forth Worth (39)
1,709
0.0995
TX East - Beaumont (40)
1,732
0.9159
TX South - Brownsville (41)
2,636
0.7816
TX South - Corpus Christi (41) 2,824
0.4200
TX South - Laredo (41)
5,259
0.1849
TX West - Del Rio (42)
1,432
0.1721
TX West - Midland-Odessa (42) 1,097
0.6006
TX West - Austin (42)
1,560
0.7219
TX West - Pecos (42)
682
0.3520
TX West - San Antonio (42)
1,090
0.5264
KY East - Covington (43)
756
0.5020
KY East - Pikeville (43)
338
0.7396
KY East - Lexington (43)
1,415
0.2080
KY West - Bowling Green (44)
438
0.0554
KY West - Louisville (44)
1,179
0.0680
MI East - Bay City (45)
420
0.4750
MI East - Flint (45)
585
0.7528
MI West (46)
3,337
0.0571
OH North - Toledo (47)
829
0.1000
OH South (48)
3,884
0.1640
TN East - Knoxville (49)
1,293
0.3125
TN East - Greeneville (49)
871
0.0825
TN Middle** (50)
1,991
0.0457
TN West - Eastern (51)
703
0.5508
IL North** (52)
7,112
0.0000
IL Central (53)
2,640
0.1551
IL South (54)
3,148
0.1708
IN North (55)
2,944
0.0539
IN South (56)
2,290
0.0642
WI East - Milwaukee (57)
2,120
0.4223
WI West (58)
1,486
0.1221
AR East (60)
2,330
0.0838
AR West**(61)
1,451
0.0001
IA North** (62)
2,797
0.0003
IA South (63)
2,702
0.4151
MN (64)
3,825
0.2747
MO East (65)
5,659
0.0762
MO West (66)
5,034
0.0770
NE - Omaha (67)
3,605
0.1126
ND (68)
1,645
0.4508
SD - (69)
2,290
0.2520

57

Inter-Judge Disparities After Booker

TABLE A1. R ANDOMIZATION T ESTS 2000-2009 (C ONTINUED )
AZ - Phoenix (70)
3,461
0.5011
AZ - Tuscon (70)
7,678
0.7057
AZ - Yuma (70)
662
0.3392
CA North (71)
2,652
0.3093
CA East (72)
5,180
0.7000
CA Central - Santa Ana (73) 1,057
0.3756
CA South - El Centro (74)
2,372
0.2427
HI** (75)
2,900
0.0015
ID (76)
1,856
0.2740
MT - Missoula (77)
452
0.1968
MT - Billings (77)
1,120
0.0624
NV (78)
4,171
0.0699
OR (79)
3,595
0.1110
WA East (80)
2,699
0.5287
WA West (81)
3,856
0.3358
CO** (82)
3,838
0.0000
KS (83)
3,987
0.1265
NM (84)
6,668
0.5484
OK North** (85)
1,529
0.0419
OK East (86)
849
0.5343
OK West** (87)
1,959
0.0001
UT (88)
3,763
0.8875
WY (89)
2,091
0.2775
DC (90)
2,746
0.5720
AK (95)
1,323
0.1546
LA Middle (96)
1,164
0.1805
Notes: Data is from the random sample from 2000-2009. I drop judges who retired or were terminated prior to
2000, and judges and district offices with an annual caseload of less than 25. For each district court, I control
for district office by sentencing year, sentencing month, and judge fixed effects. P-values reported test whether
judge fixed effects differ significantly from zero and are from a seemingly unrelated regression (SUR) on five
defendant characteristics: defendant gender, age, black race indicator, number of dependents, and less than high
school indicator. ** indicates dropped courthouses.

TABLE A2. I NTER -D ISTRICT VARIATION
A PPLICATION OF M ANDATORY M INIMUMS
Period
σ
Lower bound Upper bound No. Obs.
Koon
.0557
.0480
.0645
196358
PROTECT Act
.0628
.0541
.0730
100492
Booker
.0573
.0493
.0665
171432
Kimbrough/Gall .0652
.0562
.0758
120021
Notes: Data is from the USSC from 2000-2009. All regressions contain demographic controls and
controls for offense type, offense level, and criminal history. Regressions also contain sentencing year
fixed effects, and sentencing month fixed effects.
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TABLE A3. I NTER -D ISTRICT VARIATION
A PPLICATION OF S UBSTANTIAL A SSISTANCE
Period
σ
Lower bound Upper bound
Koon
.0837
.0722
.0971
PROTECT Act
.0877
.0756
.1017
Booker
.0850
.0734
.0983
Kimbrough/Gall .0765
.0660
.0886

No. Obs.
186982
98596
170041
119872

Notes: Data is from the USSC from 2000-2009. All regressions contain demographic controls and
controls for offense type, offense level, and criminal history. Regressions also contain sentencing year
fixed effects, and sentencing month fixed effects.

B.

Analysis of Variance

I implement an analysis of variance using a defendant-level random effects specification of the form:
Yijdtm = Xi ∗ β + γd + δt + γd ∗ δt + λm + vijdtm ,
where

vijdtm = µjdtm + ijdtm

The dependent variable Yijdtm is the sentence length in months for defendant
i assigned to judge j in district court d, sentenced in year t and month m. The
control variables include defendant and crime characteristics (Xi ),232 sentencing
year fixed effects (δt ), and sentencing month fixed effects (λm ). γd are indicator
variables for the district courthouse in which sentencing occurred. The residual
vijdtm is composed of a judge effect or value added that is constant for a judge over
time, and an idiosyncratic defendant effect. I estimate the coefficients β and the
judge effects µ via maximum likelihood (MLE). MLE estimation yields consistent
estimates of β if the judge random effects are uncorrelated with the control variables
X.
I estimate the magnitude of the judge effects under a mixed random effects specification, assuming that µjdtm is distributed N(0, σµ2 ).233 Intuitively, within judge
variance in vijdtm is used to estimate the defendant variance:
σ̂2 = V ar(vijdtm − v̄jdtm )
The variance in the judge effect is the remainder:
σ̂µ2 = V ar(vijdtm ) − σ̂2
The estimated standard deviation of judge effects on sentence length is σµ = X,
implying that a one standard deviation increase in judicial harshness raises a defendant’s sentence by X months. Because the regression specification includes district
232

Previous researchers, such as Joshua Fischman and Max Schanzenbach, have identified endogenous changes in Guidelines offense level calculations. See Fischman and Schanzenbach, supra
note 31, at 429. Results are robust to exclusion of any measure of offense level and available upon
request.
233
Boxplots of judge effects relative to the district mean presented in Figures 4-6 support the
assumption that judge effects are normally distributed.

Inter-Judge Disparities After Booker

60

courthouse fixed effects, this measure represents the impact of being assigned a
judge one standard deviation higher in harshness in the within district court distribution.
C.

Judge Demographic Regression

To analyze the differential sentencing practices of certain types of judges, I use ordinary least squares (OLS) regression. The methodology captures how judges differ
in their treatment of similar defendants in response to increased judicial discretion,
compared to other judges within the same district courthouse. Because cases are
randomly assigned to judges within a district court, judge identifiers allow one to
compare judges within the same court, capturing judge differences in sentencing
rather than different caseloads.
I identify the sources of increasing inter-disparities post Booker using a specification of the form:
Yicodtm = β0 + α ∗ Judgei ∗ Booker + β1 ∗ Booker + β2 ∗ Racei
+β3 ∗ Xi + Guideico + Of f typei + γd + δt + γd ∗ δt + λm + icodtm
Yicodtm is a sentencing outcome for defendant i, with criminal history category c and
offense level o, sentenced in district court d in year t and month m. Main outcomes
include sentence length measured in months, and binary indicators for below range
sentencing and above range sentencing.
Judgei includes judicial demographics such as race, gender, political affiliation,
an indicator for pre vs. post Guidelines appointment, tenure under the Guidelines,
and an indicator for pre vs. post Booker appointment. The main coefficients α
capture the impact of particular judicial characteristics on sentencing outcomes in
the wake of Booker and its progeny. Booker is an indicator variable for defendants
sentenced after the Booker decision.
Racei is a dummy variable for defendant i’s race: white, black, Hispanic, or
other. Xi comprises a vector of demographic characteristics of the defendant including gender, age, age squared, educational attainment (less than high school,
high school graduate, some college, college graduate), number of dependents, and
citizenship status.
Guideico includes dummy variables for criminal history category c and offense
level o, and each unique combination of criminal history category and offense level.
The interaction captures differential sentencing tendencies at each unique cell of
the Guidelines grid (258 total). To proxy for underlying offense seriousness and all
aggravating and mitigating factors, I control for final offense level. I also control
for final criminal history category. Of f typei is a dummy variable for offense type.
The specification also includes district court fixed effects (γd ), sentencing year
fixed effects (δt ), and sentencing month fixed effects (λm ). All standard errors are
clustered at the district courthouse level to account for serial correlation.
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